

**THE INTERVENTION DEBATE: TOWARDS
A POSTURE OF PRINCIPLED JUDGMENT**

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Abstract The author argues that American policymakers must take an approach based on "principled judgment" when deciding on the use of force. The 1990s showed the extremes of deciding when and how to use force, one of the central elements of strategy. Throughout American history, debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives like regional security and stopping humanitarian disasters in regions with few tangible U.S. interests. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.		
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FOREWORD

Deciding when and how to use force is one of the central elements of strategy. Throughout American history, debate has raged over whether force is appropriate only in defense of the homeland and vital national interests or whether it should also be used to promote more expansive objectives like regional security and stopping humanitarian disasters in regions with few tangible U.S. interests.

The 1990s showed the extremes of this issue. In the George H. Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell both advocated restrictive conditions for the use of force, with tangible interests at stake, clear support from the American people and Congress, and an explicit exit strategy. In the Clinton administration, officials such as National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright supported a more expansive use of force in places like the Balkans. Eventually the Clinton administration settled upon a complex set of requirements that tried to bridge many approaches, but it, too, failed to gain wide acceptance among the polity or the public at large. Today, the debate still rages.

The author of this monograph, Dr. John Garofano, Senior Fellow at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, argues that American policymakers must take an approach based on “principled judgment” when deciding on the use of force. He concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study to help Army leaders provide effective advice to national policymakers when the use of force is being considered.

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JOHN GAROFANO is Senior Fellow at the International Security Program, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, while working on a book on civil-military relations and U.S. decisions on the use of force. His areas of publication include military intervention, ASEAN and Asian security issues, and the making of U.S. foreign policy. Dr. Garofano has taught at the U.S. Army War College, Mount Holyoke and the Five Colleges, and the University of Southern California, and was a member of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute during 1999-2000. He is a Founding Member of the Council on Emerging National Security Affairs (CENSA), a think tank dedicated coordinating the efforts of experts from all fields relating to national security and to mentoring the next generation of national security leaders. Dr. Garofano received his Ph.D. from Cornell University.

SUMMARY

Political debate over the proper guidelines for using force has been polarized since the end of the Cold War. Force conservers emphasize future threats and conventional challenges, while proponents of the liberal use of force consider a wider range of national interests and accept greater risk regarding future challenges. Administrations have taken various paths between these two poles. The Weinberger Doctrine remains one of the most influential schools of thought. A contrary school of thought, that of intuitive intervention, was articulated by Secretaries of State George Shultz and Madeleine Albright but proved highly problematic. The Clinton administration settled upon a complex set of requirements that tried to bridge many approaches, but it, too, failed to gain wide acceptance among the polity or the public at large.

Without general political agreement upon a general approach to the use of force, the military services will be hard put to develop the tools required when intervention occurs. The author argues that what may be called the Powell-Bush argument is a useful starting point for forging a consensus, since it recognizes the need for flexibility, choice, and balance—in a word, judgment—when force is considered. After examining the advantages of this and the other postures adopted by previous administrations, the author makes the case for an approach of “principled judgment.” A series of principles, or guideposts, for intervention policy are then suggested, followed by the argument for several institutional changes that should strengthen the ability of diverse administrations to exercise judgment when using force. The author concludes with a discussion of Army roles and requirements for future contingencies.

THE INTERVENTION DEBATE: TOWARDS A POSTURE OF PRINCIPLED JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Continuing Debate.

Despite a decade with which to absorb and adapt to the implications of the end of the Cold War, the United States has not settled on a basic disposition towards the use of force. A debate continues between two main camps, force proponents and force conservers, defined by diverging views on the costs, risks, and effectiveness of using U.S. military force for traditional and emerging challenges. Realists and idealists, Democrats and Republicans can be found in each of these two groups. The debate was temporarily submerged in the unity that emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Yet by the end of that month, the administration's stand on the force-conserving side of the debate was already shaping U.S. strategy by eschewing operations that could lead to nation-building and humanitarian operations. It is likely that the debate shall re-emerge as a central issue of contention as U.S. foreign policy returns to something resembling "normalcy."

The two poles in the debate may be summarized as follows. Force proponents consider military power merely the first among equally valid instruments of national power, suitable for shaping the security environment as well as for responding to direct challenges to important or vital U.S. interests. These active internationalists were generally supportive of U.S. interventions in Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, and elsewhere. They believe America has a unique role in history as the sole superpower, and that it must use its power to stand up for its values as well as for a broad continuum of national interests.

Force conservers, on the other hand, believe that recent administrations have wasted precious resources on idealistic and perhaps politically-driven adventures. Such activities, argue these critics of the frequent use of force, weaken the country's ability to defend against the threats that truly matter and will inevitably arise. Whereas force proponents stress the long-term opportunities found in crises as well as the interconnectedness of vital, important, and humanitarian interests, force conservers echo Secretary of State John Quincy Adams' admonition that America should "not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy." Near-term threats to interests that are vital rather than merely important or humanitarian, and maintenance of the nation's military readiness and effectiveness against the potentially serious military challenges, inform the position of the force conservers. They usually opposed U.S. intervention in situations where we had no clear vital interest at risk.

Each school holds related views on *how* force should be employed once its use has been sanctioned. Active internationalists believe it is suitable in a variety of situations and may safely and rationally be meted out in measured doses, while force conservers prefer to use force in overwhelming bursts. Activists have confidence that limited force can usefully serve diplomatic goals, but conservers doubt the utility of limited force for vague political ends.

A final, critical distinction between the two schools bears on the guidelines that should inform decisions on the use of force. Active internationalists resist laying out maps or plans that would carefully guide when force is to be used and how. Force conservers prefer clear and strict criteria and like to refer to the Weinberger and Powell doctrines, discussed below, as examples *par excellence* of guidelines for policy.¹

The oppositional nature of this debate adversely affects U.S. foreign policy. Strategy lurches from one side to the

other, the product of elections, temporary political clout, and the winds of executive-legislative relations. This satisfies neither camp; heightens rather than lowers the shrillness of the debate; sends mixed signals to allies, potential enemies, and to instigators of local violence; and places great strain on the most frequently used foreign policy instrument—the military. In addition, lack of agreement on the purpose of military power leads to missed opportunities as well as to thinly supported operations, such as that in Somalia. When an intervention is the result of a tenuous political compromise, strategy and resources for the mission may also be compromised, potentially leading to unexpected casualties and rapid withdrawal.

This antithetical yet unresolved debate also has serious implications for military innovation and adaptation. Without some clear sense of where the nation is likely to send it, the military will resist risky, expensive, and painful changes in hardware, doctrine, and organization. Political uncertainty makes innovation a risky strategy for organizations and for leaders of those organizations.

For the Army, the strategic review undertaken by the Secretary of Defense makes a resolution of the intervention debate even more imperative. Initial reportage indicates that there will be a renewed emphasis on long-range weapons and indeed long-range, remote approaches to the use of force. Yet although strategic priorities are a vital and welcome development, policymakers, as I argue below, will continue to be buffeted by unexpected situations and subjected to unanticipated motivations to use force. This extends to the actual emplacement of troops on the ground. Basic agreement on how and when force will be used would assist the Army and all the services in adapting to international and national trends.

This monograph argues that there is common ground between the two schools of thought, and that this area can be expanded. The common ground is found in the realm of judgment—the ability to discern and weigh the myriad

factors bearing on complex international dilemmas while following some basic guidelines. In a world where new values, norms, and challenges confront the remaining superpower, no escape from judgment can legitimately be sought in a clear and fixed blueprint for action, in a rejection of all guidelines, or in a retreat from the gray areas of the national interest. What will be described as the Powell-Bush argument—to be distinguished from the Powell Doctrine or other pre-set formulas—provides a useful starting point for expanding the area of agreement. Recommendations will then be made for improving the quality of this judgment in lasting ways.

Though unsatisfactory to ideologues, judgment is a more useful construct than strict criteria and full-fledged doctrines. Judgment acknowledges that all use-of-force decisions have unique characteristics, while doctrine and narrow criteria are static and based on questionable generalizations. Judgment is based on principles of permanent relevance, including such basic facts as the strain that peace operations place on the military and the need for limited force options by policymakers and diplomats. Frequently the activist approach ignores these constraints. Criteria and doctrine are usually politically loaded and of fleeting relevance, based on prior political or ideological positions; judgment acknowledges the continuous evolution of the international security environment.

Policymakers inevitably confront situations that are in many ways new and frequently *sui generis*. Neither unbridled activism nor strict criteria prepare them adequately for these tasks. Judgment allows for necessary discussions about the frequency with which force can be used, the matching of ends with required resources, and the risks associated with various responses, including inaction. Doctrine and strict criteria assume or posit certain values for these factors and then avoid further debate, while the activist approach pays little attention to costs.

Presidents will enter office with various degrees of expertise and even interest in foreign affairs, and with advisors and advisory systems of varying degrees of effectiveness. Domestic politics will always influence foreign policy, frequently to its detriment. And as was seen merely a decade ago but forgotten prior to September 11, the security environment can change fundamentally and without warning. For these reasons, we should begin to think about how to make decisions on using force *regardless* of these inevitable limitations. This requires an agreed-upon posture of flexible, “principled judgment” and the institutional support necessary for it.

The dichotomy in the current debate belies four approaches that administrations have adopted since the Vietnam war. These are described and critically assessed in Part II. In Part III, the author sets forth several principles that should guide future decisions on the use of force. Finally, in Part IV he discusses possible methods for institutionalizing better judgment in complex decisions.

FOUR FRAMEWORKS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

The Doctrinal Approach: Weinberger and Recent Echoes.

Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger provided the first well-defined programmatic description of when and how the United States should use force in the post-Vietnam period. In a speech to the National Press Club on November 28, 1984, he laid out six “tests” that should be met before U.S. forces are employed:

1. vital national interests must be at stake;
2. the United States and allies must be willing to commit sufficient forces to win;
3. there must be clearly defined political and military objectives;

4. forces must be sized to achieve these objectives;
5. there must be reasonable assurance of support by the American people; and,
6. the use of U.S. force must be a “last resort.”²

Weinberger had two motivations for shaping the debate. First, he felt responsible for the lives of American troops, and was vehemently opposed to placing them, for example, in the “bull’s eye” of the Beirut airport. The October 23, 1983, attack that killed 241 U.S. Marines in their barracks reinforced Weinberger’s belief about what happens when a military force is not sized to fight and win but only to act as a buffer between opposing armies. He viewed it as a misuse of American soldiers and a misunderstanding of the utility of military power.

Weinberger also sought to counter what he viewed as a State Department and National Security Council (NSC) too eager to deploy U.S. forces abroad. As he explained in his memoirs, these two institutions believed in the “intermixture of diplomacy and the military”:

Roughly translated, that meant that we should not hesitate to put a battalion or so of American forces in various places in the world where we desired to achieve particular objectives of stability, or changes of government, or support of governments, or whatever else. Their feeling seemed to be that an American troop presence would add a desirable bit of pressure and leverage to diplomatic efforts, and that we should be willing to do that freely and virtually without hesitation. The NSC staff was even more militant, with a number of its members seeming to me, and to the Joint Chiefs, to spend most of their time thinking up ever more wild adventures for our troops. . . . The NSC staff’s eagerness to get us into a fight somewhere—anywhere—coupled with their apparent lack of concern for the safety of our troops and with no responsibility therefore, reminded me of the old joke, “Let’s you and him fight this out.”³

Some 2 years later, Weinberger recognized that other goals were inherent in a reasonable national security strategy (NSS). These included, in addition to the obvious

vital interests of preserving the independence, institutions, and territorial integrity of the United States and its allies, the shaping of “an international order in which our freedoms and democratic institutions can survive and prosper.” Further, they included the promotion of democratic institutions even where major reconstruction was required, the maintenance of an open international economic system, and the creation of an alliance of industrial democracies joined with the United States.⁴ Yet Weinberger and proponents of the doctrine clearly meant to exclude the frequent use of force as a preferred policy instrument. They certainly did not consider the promotion of democracy or good behavior in small countries not vital to U.S. interests a valid reason for using America’s military power.

In part due to the Clinton administration’s record, Weinberger’s skepticism of active interventionism has been mirrored in more recent calls for a set of clear and restrictive criteria.⁵ Henry Kissinger opposed intervention in Bosnia in the early 1990s on the grounds that it was not a vital security interest for the United States. In his 1994 book, *Diplomacy*, Kissinger called for criteria in order to avoid swings towards aimless interventionism; Americans’ belief in their exceptional role can lead to the desire to “remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation.” Alluding to John Quincy Adams, Kissinger notes, however, that it is just as clear that “some monsters need to be, if not slain, at least resisted. What is most needed are *criteria for selectivity*.⁶

John Hillen claims that because it did not develop the criteria purportedly called for by Kissinger, the Clinton administration squandered resources on “a host of ‘feel-good’ operations” such as those in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. Even in Europe, American policy is “determined by local factions in Bosnia,” with the United States “relegated... to the role of a medium-sized player in a peripheral European security affair.” Hillen then asks for criteria that mirror Weinberger’s.⁷

Ambassador William Abshire, Director of the Center for the Study of the Presidency and organizer of a transition team report, makes a similar argument. He hails the wisdom of President Dwight Eisenhower in purportedly laying out a clear list of strict criteria that would have been necessary for intervention in Indochina in 1954. Ambassador Abshire and others contend that this led to the wise decision not to use force at that time, and that this is a useful model for the future.⁸ Others echo this general perspective.⁹

Assessing the Weinberger Doctrine. Despite indications of change, the Weinberger Doctrine retains broad legitimacy and support in significant portions of the defense community—and for good reason. Its author's ultimate rationale was the protection of the nation's capacity effectively to deter and, if necessary, fight and win battles that threaten its very existence. To order soldiers to their deaths for less vital tasks is not "fully warranted"; other instruments of national power should be used instead.¹⁰ This combination of avoiding casualties for nonvital aims and the need for a significant force in reserve continue to reverberate in a period in which U.S. military operational tempo is at an all-time high for peacetime.

Yet agreeing upon useful criteria is much more difficult than calling for them. Consider Vietnam. The war involved guerrilla, conventional, international, and civil aspects. The superpowers and major regional powers had strong interests in the outcome, some of them possessed nuclear weapons, and all of them supplied their clients. The battleground was a developing country with minimal infrastructure and characterized by multiple cultures, climates, terrain, and political identities.

Such complexities do not lend themselves readily to simple criteria or checklists any more than they resemble conventional campaigns in a desert. It is not surprising, then, that, despite his call for criteria, Kissinger explains U.S. mistakes in Vietnam not in terms of absent criteria but

by noting policymakers' inability to understand guerrilla war, their blind faith in a flawed "domino theory," and their attempts to create a South Vietnam in America's image.¹¹ None of these, it should be noted, could have been avoided or corrected by the kinds of criteria that politicians and policy analysts have offered: "Being smarter" is a difficult standard, and one that cannot be called into being through stipulation.

Similarly, in explaining nonintervention in Indochina in 1954, Kissinger correctly focuses not on criteria but rather on Eisenhower's overriding belief that America's unique image of being a noncolonial great power was more valuable than Indochina itself.¹² To this we can add Eisenhower's visceral opposition to placing ground troops on mainland Asia, and his sensitivity to taking any initial steps that would, he was sure, lead the ultimate commitment. In effect, Eisenhower used criteria to justify to the American public his decision against intervention: criteria did not determine the wisdom of his decision.¹³

The lesson is that criteria should contribute to sorting out complex phenomena; they should not simplify reality to the point where they cease to become aids to decisionmaking. Ultimately, they cannot replace insight, instinct, and judgment. To this end, Kissinger's basic formulation of "criteria for selectivity" remains helpful. Unlike the Weinberger school's focus on strict criteria directly translatable into action, criteria for selectivity allows for the kind of judgment and insight required by policymakers.

If matching criteria to complex and changing environments is the first problem with the Weinberger Doctrine, a second is its reliance on the touchstone concept of "vital national interests." This concept garnered consensus when international threats, rather than conceptual efforts, delineated for policymakers the boundaries between vital and other interests. Weinberger's 1984 Report to Congress included in the category basic

threats to the country's freedom, the general deterrence of Soviet attack, and the defense of "key forward theaters" in all regions.¹⁴ Few would have argued vehemently with this categorization.

Even at the height of the Cold War, however, it was difficult to know where the critical inner circle of "vital" interests ended and where the next concentric circle of merely "important" or otherwise significant interests began. One can look to Southeast Asia or to Central America for examples in abundance during the Cold War.

Since the Cold War, there are more serious problems with using the vital national interest construct as a guide to policy. One is that the task of distinguishing vital from less-than-vital interests has become even more difficult. To many, Bosnia matters to the United States because of its location, the atrocities, the ethnic groups involved there and in neighboring countries, the danger of spillover and of NATO's fragmentation, and the European Union's earlier choices. To others, the problem indicates that NATO should stay within its historical area of concern, avoiding the imbroglio of ethnic strife in forbidding terrain. And if there is fundamental disagreement on the significance of ethnic cleansing or genocide in southeastern Europe, there is unlikely to be agreement on any issue other than war on the Korean peninsula and possibly in the Persian Gulf. A skeptic might conclude that even NATO's new members would do well to note that Article 5 of the NATO treaty calls only for consultations on appropriate action in the event of an attack on a member nation.

The doctrinal approach to such disagreement is to err on the side of caution in the sense of retaining the ability to fight major wars later rather than securing questionable interests now. Military force should play its "essential, but circumscribed and necessarily limited, role" in foreign policy.¹⁵ Where the stakes are not clearly vital, leaders cannot depend upon public support, and the military is unlikely to receive clear orders and goals.

Related to this general limitation is the extent to which vital and near-term security threats are interwoven with less-than-vital and longer-term or merely potential threats. It could be argued that the very notion of a hierarchy of national interests—so central to the *realpolitik* outlook of most statesmen—depends on a logic that is now open to question. The realist architects of America’s containment policy worried that weak states might bandwagon with communist powers, garner industrial and manpower resources, and use these resources to conquer more territory through labor-intensive warfare. Today, statesmen legitimately worry over refugee flows, capital flight, transnational crime, and the conditions in which political terrorism incubates. Any of these problems—which in and of themselves reside in the “important” or “humanitarian” categories—can spill over into the vital category under the right conditions. In other words, the importance and scope of secondary interests have grown, and they are potentially connected to vital interests in fundamentally new ways.

This raises the stakes for U.S. leadership in gray areas while requiring varied and innovative forms for that leadership. A failure to take a stand against genocide where we have the ability to do so at low cost, for example, will undermine the moral legitimacy of our objections to oppressive political systems. The bombing of U.S. embassies abroad requires some response, too, but this is unlikely to include an overwhelming conventional military attack on a state.

A final issue related to the concept of vital national interests is its limited utility as a guidepost for proactive action. The approach connotes present and foreseeable threats rather than future potentialities. The Department of Defense’s (DoD) aim of shaping the security environment through military-to-military exchanges, exercises, and related programs, recognizes that there are major opportunities to be had by improving relations and promoting transparency among friend and foe alike. Each of

the unified combatant commands can reasonably claim successes in this area.

A third major area of deficiency in the Weinberger approach is that its strict criteria downplay the role of presidential vision. Regarding Grenada, President Ronald Reagan asked: “What kind of a country would we be . . . if we refused to help small but steadfast democratic countries in our neighborhood to defend themselves against the threat of serious danger of being killed or taken hostage?”¹⁶ A president with a different vision would have acted differently or not at all. President George Bush had a similar personal reaction and initiated the process that led to intervention in Somalia.

Presidents are unlikely to condone or, if they do condone them, adhere closely to, strict criteria. They will rely instead on the vision and motivations that propelled them to seek election and for which the public voted. Such motivations, and the kaleidoscopic makeup of “vision,” cannot be pigeonholed into strict criteria. If promulgated, they will be violated. Weak criteria are bad criteria, for they will be violated and will not be effective guides for policymakers or for those who must execute the overridden criteria.

Many decisions to use force, then, have been made without the involvement of the public ahead of time. More to the point, Weinberger’s “assured public support” stipulation is unreliable as a guide because the persistence of such support depends to a large extent on choices that can be made only after military involvement. This is discussed in more detail below, but two examples will be given here. Public support for U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained strong even after some 150,000 American casualties.¹⁷ The problem was a failing strategy, not public support in general. Support was also initially high and then indifferent for U.S. involvement in Somalia. A mistaken decision to capture an unsavory but politically important warlord—a major change in strategy in the summer of 1993—led to a major congressional attack on U.S. policy. As discussed

below, public support for humanitarian operations remains more than sufficient to support operations with clear, reasonable goals and an expectation of some success.

A fourth, more specific problem is the doctrine's corrosive effect on strategically ambiguous policies. Strategic ambiguity plays a critical role in any country's foreign policy. It is necessary due to limitations on resources: since we cannot be in all places at all times, it makes sense not to announce ahead of time when and where we will react. As the Truman administration discovered following its public exclusion of the Republic of Korea from the U.S. security commitment, this will not only invite unwelcome challenges, but may misrepresent the actual U.S. response in the event of a challenge.

Related to the ambiguity problem is the importance of reputation: Is it productive to enshrine in a declared doctrine a U.S. unwillingness to engage in limited operations where casualties will be small but significant? According to the "Ladenese epistle," Osama bin Laden considered the U.S. retreat from Lebanon strong evidence that the United States did not have the stomach for battle.¹⁸

Furthermore, even a president, administration, or public may not know how they will react to a given challenge to important but nonvital national interests; thus strategic ambiguity may accurately reflect internal ambiguity. President George Bush's initial inclination to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was to "wait and see." Very quickly, this changed to drawing a line in the sand. It is possible, too, that a strict-criteria interpretation of vital interests would coincide with General Colin Powell's early view in the Gulf crisis that America's vital interests were not threatened by Saddam Hussein's gaining increased control over the price of oil, and that Saudi Arabia could still be protected.

Fifth, adherence to Weinberger's criteria ignores the ubiquitous role of hedging against unforeseeable risks in foreign policymaking. A nation with global interests must remain engaged and will always be overstretched if one

measures elasticity in terms of where the country would be successful if the global environment disintegrated rapidly. Yet the task of statesmen is to balance risks, make the most of available resources, and plan prudently for the future. In doing so, they may rationally, though unintentionally, become engaged in foreign policy swamps while seeking to prevent a wider, more costly conflagration.¹⁹

This, rather than a violation of some preferred notion of strict criteria, explains U.S. involvement in Bosnia. The U.S. guarantee of safe passage for redeploying European troops was necessary to secure the continent's involvement. This was important not only for Bosnia, but for the broadly accepted U.S. national interest of promoting a European security identity. Later, the implications of this guarantee meant that U.S. troops would be on the ground if the Western position in Bosnia disintegrated. Since U.S. combat troops would be on the ground in any case, their role was expanded to become part of a larger political framework.²⁰

A final set of criticisms revolves around the question of *how* force should be used. The issue here is whether the Weinberger Doctrine is essentially a foreign policy or a defense policy. Weinberger's second, third, and fourth points (win, have clear goals, send sufficient forces) severely circumscribe both the use of limited force and the use of greater amounts of force for limited objectives. His definition of "winning" is particularly constraining. Railing against the Vietnam experience, he focused on the type of goals that are clearly achievable through conventional military means.

Many contemporary threats are not conducive to the "no more Vietnams" perspective, however. Allowing a likely enemy to develop a chemical or biological capability could eventually preclude the effective lodgment of American or allied troops at a point of entry, or the enemy could kill enough troops to have devastating effects on public support. Preventing or defeating such threats may require a forceful,

though not overwhelming or decisive, U.S. attack. In this scenario, saving the military only for major wars may make fighting a major war more costly in the long run. Moreover, one of the major explanations for the pervasiveness of limited war in the 20th century is the danger of escalation. The United States did not fail in Vietnam because it did not know how to win, but because a winning strategy might have provoked a larger war, perhaps even a spiral toward a thermonuclear exchange. As more states acquire nuclear weapons in coming decades, decisive force will be ever more dangerous. Military force must serve policy, and policy requires more options than those offered by the Weinberger Doctrine.

The doctrine also raises the issues of the analytical level and time period for which a political objective is defined. Strict criteria tend to validate only those operations that are sure to achieve a concrete objective in the near term. For example, Weinberger was unhappy with the deployment of Marines to Lebanon because their military mission was unclear and the political aims fuzzy and unattainable. Powell says he held a similar view.²¹

Secretary of State George Shultz and the NSC, on the other hand, believed U.S. support for the Multinational Force in Lebanon was a valid use of American power and prestige for critical national security goals.

Success would have been of immense strategic value to us. A stable Lebanon could be a bridge country in the Middle East; a Lebanon dominated by Syria and the Soviet Union would contribute to tension and constitute a site for threats against Israel. Lebanon had taken the brunt of turmoil from Middle East problems. Peace in Lebanon could contribute to peace elsewhere.²²

Failure resulted from a variety of tactical maneuvers and mistakes by Israeli political and military leaders, U.S. decisionmakers, and short-sighted terrorists, in this view.²³

Leaving aside the possibility that Shultz was guilty of wishful thinking, he had the clear political objective of furthering peace in a leap-frogging way, of using a present crisis to change dramatically the picture of the Middle East in 5 or 10 years' time. His conceptual level of analysis was regional stability and, beyond that, the balance of superpower influence in a pivotal region. Shultz could not, however, identify the more operational and short-term political objectives that Weinberger demanded. For Weinberger and the strict criteria school, having clear political goals really means having goals that are achievable in the near term and explicable in limited geographical, even territorial, terms. They doubt that small demonstrations of force will have larger payoffs in the realm of intangibles such as prestige and leadership.

This perspective is unacceptable from the Clausewitzian perspective that war should serve policy, and that the only true point of view from which to observe international challenges, as Clausewitz put it, is provided by the political realm.²⁴ Force does not serve policy only when it is used in an overwhelming way, or when casualties are below a certain level—although these qualifications are completely understandable from the warfighter's perspective. Injecting into political deliberations the potential costs of ignoring basic principles of warfare is also legitimate. But it cannot determine policy or the foreign policy goals that will be sought after in the first place.

Finally, there is the quandary of using force only as a last resort. The strict criteria school holds that U.S. lives should not be risked unless absolutely necessary, and the nation's military power as a whole should be conserved for more vital challenges. There are two problems with this approach. One, offered by Shultz and later seconded by Bush, is that holding force as a final policy option makes it more likely that force will eventually be necessary: the early use of force may head off bigger problems down the road.

Thus U.S. demonstrations of power may have saved the democratic movement in the Philippines during the Marcos-Aquino transition, for example. By contrast, their absence, as in Europe in the 1930s, Korea in early 1950s, or Bosnia in 1993-95, may prove more costly by orders of magnitude than would have an earlier use of force.²⁵ “[T]he capability and will to use force as a first resort,” Richard Nixon wrote, “reduces the possibility of having to use force as a last resort when the risk of casualties would be far greater.”²⁶ Furthermore, the instinct to rely first on nonmilitary options may “almost certainly cede the initial military initiative and advantage to the enemy,” in the words of the Army After Next Project.²⁷

Recent critiques of the Clinton administration’s 1998 bombings of Sudan and Afghanistan are germane. Far from demonstrating our will to root out terrorism, they may have demonstrated the administration’s unwillingness to accept any casualties in that fight.

The second problem with the last resort clause is that when presidents consider using the instruments of national power, they appear *not* to do so in sequential terms, with diplomacy at the beginning and force at the end of a chain of possibilities. Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Reagan, and Bush considered force an early and proper response to problems in Lebanon, the Congo, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama. President Carter, and perhaps Johnson on Vietnam, are the exceptions, avoiding higher levels of force in Desert One and in Vietnam until they became so costly as to be nearly irrelevant. Using force early may simply be the most effective response to a threat, turning that threat into an opportunity.

More importantly, this appears to reflect presidents’ thinking. The system within which such decisions are made, therefore, would do well to respect this common presidential attribute.

In sum, the Weinberger Doctrine is instructive in the lessons of using adequate power to accomplish one’s aims

and against needlessly risking life and reputation. The remaining propositions, however, require that one accept the doctrine's foundation that force should only be used for vital national interests—indeed, that that category remains useful for policymakers. If one questions this assumption, which seems reasonable in the contemporary security environment, then one must also question the doctrine's pillars of overwhelming force defined in military terms, last resort, and assured public support.

The Shultz-Albright Approach: Intuitive Interventionism.

Shultz made the landmark case for the relatively frequent use of limited force for important foreign policy goals. In a well-known speech of October 25, 1984, he lamented America's "Hamlet problem" and claimed that the country was "worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond" to the growing problem of terrorism. "A great nation with global responsibilities cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and indecisiveness," and must go beyond defensive measures to consider means of "active prevention, preemption, and retaliation," argued Shultz. Furthermore, the American public "must understand *before the fact* that occasions will come when their government must act before each and every fact is known—and the decisions cannot be tied to the opinion polls." Shultz felt that duly elected officials had the right and responsibility to make such decisions.²⁸

He sought to decrease the influence of the Pentagon in general and of Weinberger in particular. In Shultz's view, they held an irrational and narrow preference for nonmilitary options to the detriment of diplomacy and broader foreign policy goals. He believed this led to stalling even, for example, when the bombing of the Marine barracks required reinforcements, and when the President expressed his desire to intervene in Grenada.²⁹

Shultz was convinced that the evolving war against terrorism in particular demanded action. He recalled:

To Weinberger, as I heard him, our forces were to be constantly built up but not used: everything in our defense structure seemed geared exclusively to deter World War III against the Soviets; diplomacy was to solve all the other problems we faced around the world. . . . Only if and when the population, by some open measure, agreed in advance would American armed forces be employed, and even then, only if we were assured of winning swiftly and at minimal cost. This was the Vietnam syndrome in spades, carried to an absurd level, and a complete abdication of the duties of leadership.³⁰

Throughout his term in office and long after it,³¹ Shultz stressed the need to interweave diplomacy and force in a wide range of situations. “We have to be strong, and, more than that, we have to be willing to use our strength” in what he labeled the “gray area challenges.” “We are participants and we are engaged”; the United States is “not just an onlooker.” To ignore new challenges would be “absurd.”³² The “essence of statesmanship” is “to see a danger when it is not self-evident; to educate our people to the stakes involved; then to fashion a sensible response and rally support.” All of this requires “prudent, limited, proportionate uses of our military power” in a variety of situations ranging from responses to terrorism to peacekeeping and traditional power projection.³³

These words are reminiscent of Albright’s later asking Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) General Colin Powell, “What’s the point of having this superb military that we’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” and of her stating: “If we have to use force, it is because we are America. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future.”³⁴ Indeed, the many Secretaries of State from both parties who were active interventionists—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, Dean Rusk, and Kissinger, in addition to Shultz and Albright—indicate that this perspective is found in both political parties and among individuals who might identify

themselves primarily as either realists or idealists. There is also ample resonance in the public debate.³⁵

Assessing Intuitive Interventionism. Shultz's version of active interventionism has much to commend it. It provides the president a full panoply of the instruments of national power while offering multiple responses to unanticipated international crises. It allows an administration to use military force, a potentially decisive and usually the most potent instrument of national power to take advantage of new foreign policy opportunities. The absence of clear criteria for action may allow a president to pick and choose advice and advisors, or to rely on his own views when he deems it necessary. This could stimulate creative policymaking, allowing for new solutions to unanticipated problems.

At the same time, as a guide for using force there are potentially fatal flaws in this approach. First, there is the danger of excessive presidential latitude. For example, President Bush explained his decision to intervene in Somalia by stating that after weeks of watching starving children on television he "just couldn't take it any more." He therefore called in General Powell, asked what was necessary to do the job, and gave the order. Powell's reluctance held little sway.³⁶ Thus commenced an immediate problem for an incoming administration and a long chapter in post-Cold War humanitarian interventions. Similarly, the timing of President Clinton's Desert Fox campaign and the missile attacks on Afghani and Sudanese targets may have been diversions from domestic problems.³⁷ One could further point to both the Bay of Pigs debacle and the early Clinton administration experience in Somalia to demonstrate how inexperienced national security teams can make serious mistakes.³⁸ And Reagan's decision to use force in Grenada, it should be added, allowed insufficient time for planning.

Second, as an attitude towards policymaking this approach surrenders the initiative to the enemy. Without

strong guiding principles or criteria, America would run the risk of responding to terrorism or genocide around the globe. Furthermore, mobilizing an unwieldy political system behind a discrete policy of responding to terrorism, as Shultz wanted, is difficult. Once the system moves in a certain direction, in motion inertia can take over at the expense of the need to make subtle choices.

A related problem concerns the scope of responses. Many forms of force might be used against terrorists. Advances in counterterror capabilities will only expand the potential target list as we learn more about the perpetrators of past terrorist acts, the planners of future ones, and the manufacturers of biological, nuclear, or missile capabilities. Domestic politics will inevitably lend further pressure for action. The Clinton administration felt pressure to respond to the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, and this pressure probably contributed to hasty decisions to retaliate.³⁹ Requisite though action may be, the activist approach does not suggest limits to the scope of these responses.

A third major drawback is that this approach is likely to engender precisely the kinds of internal dynamics that Shultz himself decried—palace politics and bureaucratic infighting that ignore strategic planning. Competition for the president's ear is always part of the policymaking process, but, in the absence of use-of-force guidelines, it will be even more strident as advisors attempt to gain the president's support for any of a variety of options that he or she has not ruled out. This may lead to the kind of hostile relationships that existed between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski during the Carter administration. These are counterproductive to the healthy airing of options and to the consensus building on complex problems.

A fourth shortcoming is the increased influence of intuitive but unexamined feelings of competence that can arise alongside fear in the face of new, unfamiliar global

developments. The historian John Lewis Gaddis has explained how swings in vague beliefs about national capabilities determined the general outlines of Democratic and Republican foreign policies during the Cold War. This phenomenon of capabilities driving policy and determining interests may explain why the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations declined to intervene massively in Indochina, for example, whereas the Johnson administration took up that challenge. The latter believed that its nation-building, counterinsurgency, and conventional capabilities had increased sufficiently to earn an American victory.⁴⁰

This should be a concern today for at least two reasons. The U.S. military has dramatically increased its ability to conduct peace operations. Unfortunately, successes contributed to the expansive goals of the early Clinton administration. In a related way, the impact of precision-guided weapons on policymakers has been undeniable. Belief in their efficacy shaped planning for the war against Kosovo. Yet it also precluded consideration at the highest levels of a ground option, and delayed necessary military planning for ground operations among allies.⁴¹ Similarly, our ability to contain Saddam through a quiet precision war has meant that any change in the dual containment policy would require a major change in outlook and most likely a new administration.⁴²

A final, serious problem with the activist school is their reticence on the issue of how force should be used—in what proportion to the problem or according to what general principles. In the absence of these standards, there are two dangers. One is that force will be unsuccessful, due to a lack of care for or understanding of the uses and limits of military force by central decisionmakers. The other is that force will be successful, or intermittently so, but in any case will incur significant casualties because the costs and risks of success and failure were not part of the initial calculation. Defeat or disaster harms the reputation of the United States, while

pyrrhic victories obviously harm the military services and may poison civil-military relations.

By implication, the type and level of force used should be commensurate with the problem, as judged by some group of policymakers. This, too, causes discomfort to force-conservers and to the military, for it leaves open the possibility of death by a thousand cuts, or by more blunt trauma such as the misguided entry into major conflicts. As examples of the former, critics point to the overstretched nature of military forces today, and for the latter, to the supposedly gradual escalation during the Vietnam War. This problem persists, as will be clear from the discussion below of the Clinton "sliding-scale" approach to the use of force.

These potentially serious pitfalls need not result in bad policy. Shultz, for example, was mindful of the basic requirements for the effective use of force. His "Plan of Action" on Grenada consisted of 10 major initiatives covering the legal, political, diplomatic, public relations, and military fronts. Notably, they also included plans for the transition to civilian power and for the withdrawal of U.S. forces, worked out in advance between the State Department and the Joint Chiefs.⁴³

Unfortunately, not all duly elected or appointed officials will have the foresight and impetus to execute such planning. Nor, to the extent the initiative is surrendered to the enemy, will they have the time and resources to do so: the development of Operation JUST CAUSE allowed time to plan, for example, while Operation URGENT FURY did not. In these situations it would help to have some basic principles limiting when and how force will be used. Furthermore, while Shultz was focused primarily on the terrorist threat, today American power confronts a wide range of issues, which make the problem of relevant guidelines all the more complicated. Yet thus far, active interventionists have not put forth such guidelines. The Clinton period provides a case study.

Unsatisfactory Compromise: Criteria Overload and the Proliferation of Interests during the Clinton Years.

Confronted with a wave of humanitarian suffering and ethnic conflict around the globe, the Clinton administration struggled to find its way on intervention policy. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Clinton stated the need to take a more active role in Bosnia, where the Bush administration had studiously avoided military involvement.⁴⁴ After the election, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake seemed to set the conceptual tone of future policy by describing himself as a realistic idealist who, like President Woodrow Wilson, was willing to use force to back up principle. In September 1992, Les Aspin, Clinton's first Secretary of Defense, argued publicly that military force had an important role in broader foreign policy. He defended the use of force for limited objectives, asserted that limited war could be properly controlled, and claimed that extrication from limited operations was not nearly so difficult as from major wars. Aspin focused on the value of precision-guided munitions in carrying out limited operations with minimal threats to U.S. forces and to collateral entities.⁴⁵

Yet initially the administration was wary and somewhat divided on the issue of loosening the strictures on the use of force that had accrued during the previous decade. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated in April 1993 that any use of force would require clear objectives, a good chance of success, a strong likelihood of public or congressional support, and a clear exit strategy. Then-Ambassador to the United Nations (U.N.) Madeleine Albright argued that U.S. support for U.N. operations was predicated upon there being a real threat to international peace and security, clearly defined objectives and scope, a cease-fire in place, agreement among warring parties to an international presence, adequate financial resources, and an "end-point" to U.N. participation. President Clinton reiterated to the U.N. this general hesitancy to use force.⁴⁶ Yet later Secretary of State Albright would be pressing

CJCS Powell to do something with the vast military power at his disposal, and would remain an active proponent of using force.⁴⁷

This public schizophrenia, together with the crises and harsh criticism over the administration's handling of Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, led to a major review of official policy on U.S. participation in peace and humanitarian operations. Begun in early 1993, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 was not signed until May 1994. By then it included a list of eight factors to be considered before the United States would vote positively for a U.N. peace operation, 14 if the United States were to participate, and 17 if U.S. troops were likely to encounter combat.

The factors that would cause a favorable U.S. vote on the Security Council for a peace operation included many of those previously mentioned by Albright and the president at the U.N.: the advancement of U.S. interests, and international concern for dealing with the problem on a multilateral basis; a clear threat to or breach of international peace through aggression, humanitarian disaster coupled with violence, or the "[s]udden interruption of established democracy or gross violation of human rights coupled with violence, or [the] threat of violence"; clear objectives and an understanding of the nature of the mission (i.e., whether it is a Chapter VI peacekeeping or a Chapter VII peace enforcement action); a cease-fire if Chapter VI, or a significant threat to international peace and security if Chapter VII; the availability of military and financial resources, and a mandate clear enough to accomplish the mission; evidence that the international community has weighed and judged as unacceptable the political, economic, and humanitarian consequences of inaction; and the judgment that the anticipated duration of the conflict is tied to clear objectives and realistic criteria for ending the operation.

The "even stricter" standards applied to cases where the United States would be asked to participate include

whether participation would advance U.S. interests, and whether the risks to American personnel have been weighed and considered acceptable; resources are available; U.S. participation is necessary for the operation's success; the role of U.S. forces is tied to clear objectives and an endpoint (undefined) can be identified; domestic support exists or can be gotten; and command and control arrangements are acceptable.

Finally, the “even more rigorous factors” applied in cases where U.S. forces might confront combat include ensuring that there exists a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives; there exists a plan to achieve those objectives “decisively”; and there is a commitment to reassess and adjust as necessary.⁴⁸

Secretary of Defense William Perry offered his own list of criteria in his 1995 Report to the President and the Congress. He said that before intervention the administration would consider, among other issues, existing treaty commitments; the willingness of other nations to contribute to an operation; whether unilateral U.S. action is justified; the clarity of military objectives supporting political objectives; judgments about costs and duration; likely public and congressional support; the willingness to commit sufficient forces to achieve objectives; and the acceptability of proposed arrangements for command and control of U.S. forces.⁴⁹

Assessing the Clinton Administration Approach. After initially stumbling, the Clinton approach settled on a plethora of criteria. Yet the result was that it was less of a guide than those offered by Weinberger. The PDD 25 laundry list goes far beyond the Weinberger Doctrine in its overall breadth and in its specific requirements (including, for example, decisive victory). However, in effect these are less constraining and less helpful because they are merely “standards” or “factors to be applied” rather than a set of interrelated criteria which together form a doctrine or even a general philosophical approach.

Further, the relative weight of each factor is left to the imagination. As a result, it is not clear what role each factor or combination of factors ought to play in a given decision on the use of force. The Clinton administration decided against using force to stop the conflict in Rwanda in 1994 but in favor of a major peacekeeping operation in Bosnia at the end of 1995. Later Clinton stated that he would intervene if another Rwanda-scale atrocity occurred. Clinton alternated between a hard and soft line on North Korea in 1995-96, and made carefully calibrated military moves in the Taiwan Strait in March of 1996. He agreed to an air war to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo but did not embrace ground operations that would have been more effective. These choices were not all bad; inconsistency does not equate with confusion. The appearance of inconsistency and the lack of an anchor, however, have serious domestic and international impact. In short, it was not clear to the average observer whether and which of the many criteria were followed, or why.

A second major problem was that the greater number of criteria had to compete with expanding conceptions of the national interest. The Clinton administration's official NSS documents did not clarify the issue. These claim that decisions on the use of force are dictated by national interests, but that vital, important, humanitarian, and other interests all may require the use of force. Since at least 1994 the administration has sided with the Powell-Bush view that it "is unwise to specify in advance all the limitations we will place on our use of force," that "the costs and risks of U.S. military involvement must be judged to be commensurate with the stakes involved," and that a series of questions would be answered before force is used: "Have we explored or exhausted nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of achieving our goals? Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission? What level of effort will be needed to achieve our goals? What are the potential costs—human and financial—of the operation? What are the opportunity costs in terms of maintaining our capability

to respond to higher-priority contingencies? Do we have milestones and a desired end state to guide a decision on terminating the mission?” Regarding how force will be used, NSS 99 states that U.S. forces will be given clear missions and the means to achieve their objectives decisively, and that allied assistance will be sought when practicable.⁵⁰

The main problem with this apparently reasonable approach is that the administration continuously increased the breadth of national security interests that it considered important. By 1999 these included ethnic conflict; a wide range of humanitarian issues; the sexual, military, and labor exploitation of minors; trafficking in women and children; and involuntary servitude.⁵¹

Statements by administration officials also contradicted documents such as PDD 25 and NSS 99. In 1996, for example, Lake offered an extensive list of circumstances that may require the use of force. These included, apparently in order of descending importance, direct attacks on the United States, its citizens, and its allies; direct aggression; threats to key economic interests; the preservation, promotion, and defense of democracy; the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, international crime, and drug trafficking; the maintenance of U.S. credibility; and humanitarian disasters.⁵² The conditions under which these would trigger military action remained unspecified. “But the greater the number and weight of the interests in play, the greater the likelihood that we will use force—once all peaceful means have been tried and failed, and once we have measured a mission’s benefits against its costs, in both human and financial terms.”⁵³

The Clinton administration partially fleshed out a case-by-case approach to using force with a plethora of concerns and questions. Yet as an actual guide to decisions, the sheer volume and expansiveness of interests and factors were self-defeating, overburdening the administration’s capacity to weigh and judge.

Furthermore, unlike in the Weinberger approach, there was neither a predisposition towards overwhelming force nor skepticism of limited force. On the contrary, the Clinton approach to *how* force will be used—what may best be described as a “sliding scale” approach—makes the overall decision even more complex. This was explained by Perry in 1995 when he argued for the “rule of commensurate military force.” He saw few “first category” threats to U.S. national interests after the Cold War. When the interests are not vital, the threats will not be clear-cut, but “we must be willing to consider the use of force commensurate with our interests.” Thus “our use of force must be selected and limited, reflecting the relative importance of the outcome to our interests.” This occurred, in his view, in the Clinton administration’s decision to use military force to restore order in Haiti. Initially, U.S. interests were not challenged starkly. Thus the administration used economic and diplomatic leverage. Eventually our interests became more seriously engaged and threatened, Perry explained. The threat of force worked at the eleventh hour, but American troops arrived nonetheless and were critical to the success of the policy.⁵⁴

Perry contrasted the use of force in Haiti with the administration’s initial decision not to use force in Bosnia. The ethical responsibility posed by the “abhorrent” ethnic cleansing by the Serbs was not enough to warrant action, “because America does not have enough at stake to warrant the massive American casualties that would occur on all sides if we widened the war. Therefore, that course is unacceptable.” Yet the United States cannot do nothing, because we “do have a security interest in limiting the violence and preventing it from spreading and stimulating a broader European war,” and we “certainly have a humanitarian interest in mitigating the effects of the violence and the human suffering.” Speaking 8 months before the Dayton Accords committed U.S. troops, Perry claimed that “[w]e have been able to achieve these goals in Bosnia at an acceptable risk to Americans.” Larger-scale

intervention was ruled out because of “the limited U.S. interests at stake.” He was skeptical about using the military for humanitarian purposes. “Generally, the military is not the right tool to meet humanitarian concerns. There are other organizations, government and private, to do this work. We field an army, not a salvation army.”⁵⁵

In claiming that force will be used on this basis, the approach makes explicit the assumptions of the active internationalists and diverges from the Weinberger Doctrine. As a result, decisions concerning *how* force is used can become unhinged from *whether* it is used. There are no thresholds of decisiveness or of costs and risks to guide decisions. Issues of timing (first vs. last resort) or intensity (overwhelming vs. incremental force) are avoided completely.

The “rule of commensurate military force” is indeed a major step forward in acknowledging the need to respond flexibly to a host of new threats. Yet as Perry would find before leaving the administration, a formulation that hinges on flexible definitions of both interests and force levels is, in effect, likely to lead to the frequent use of force if it is not undergirded by clear thresholds—thresholds of interests, costs, and force below which military power will not be used. More importantly, the Bosnia case would reveal that the laundry- or check-list approach is insufficient. In the end, civilian Bosnia casualties drove the administration and the Europeans to intervene, rather than the threat of a wider conflagration mentioned by Perry.

The Clinton administration lacked a clear philosophy, as well as a clear set of agreed-upon standards, for using force. Yet this did not lead to the kind of wanton use of force that might have been indicated by some of the administration’s early rhetoric. The President had proclaimed during a trip to the Balkans in June 1999, for example, that the United States would halt wars based on religion, race, or ethnicity if “it’s within our power to stop it.”⁵⁶ Yet the administration chose not to use force early or serious force in the Rwanda or

Sierra Leone conflicts or in Chechnya or Dagestan, among other possibilities. It did use a degree of discretion in choosing where to fight.⁵⁷ The administration only accomplished the minimal aims that it set for itself and which passed muster with Congress and the American public. Furthermore, when the conflict in Kosovo, for example, was drawn out beyond expectations, the administration became more realistic and planned for the use of ground and ground-attack forces. It should be made clear that in that crisis many senior military leaders were no more convinced than were civilians of the need to use blunt, costly ground forces.

There are three kinds of problems when a basic philosophy is lacking: clarity of signals; domestic pressures; and improper employment of force. First, while etching guidelines in stone will provide a clear roadmap for our enemies, the absence of a basic philosophy can open the way to actions and probes by America's enemies. Saddam probably did not take seriously the administration's warnings in 1997 about knocking out its WMD capabilities. Second, domestic pressures and concerns—including those with legitimate and significant international origins, such as the growing concern for humanitarian abuses—will inevitably play an important role in determining international actions if there is no underlying philosophy on the use of force and a commitment to following through on it. Domestic concerns may also set limits on the tolerance of casualties if they do not accord with the importance of an operation. The problem is not unique to the Clinton administration. The Carter administration had an ambivalent view towards the role of force in the international system. Once in power, Carter found it necessary to renege on campaign promises to reduce the role of force in American foreign policy. Finally, without a basic philosophy, an administration risks using too little or too much force due to over- or under-reactions because of unclear motivations about the reasons for the intervention

or the above-mentioned role of domestic pressures and limitations.

The Powell Doctrine vs. the Powell-Bush Argument: Foundations for an Approach.

In no small part due to his unhappiness with what he saw as a lack of direction on Bosnia during the early Clinton period, Powell entered the intervention debate at the end of the Cold War. He made his views known in an October 1992 letter to the editor of the *New York Times* and in a major article in that winter's issue of *Foreign Affairs*. In the October letter, which the *Times* entitled "Why Generals Get Nervous," Powell spoke approvingly of the rescue operation at the American embassy in Somalia, the ousting of Manuel Noriega in Panama, and the limited use of force to prevent the toppling of democracy in the Philippines.⁵⁸ "All of these operations had one thing in common: they were successful. There have been no Bay of Pigs, failed desert raids, Beirut bombings, and no Vietnams." The reason for the successes, he made clear, was that "in every instance we have carefully matched the use of military force to our political objectives."⁵⁹

Powell further developed the theme in the *Foreign Affairs* article. He argued that, before committing forces abroad, policymakers should be able to answer the following, somewhat loaded questions: "Is the political objective we seek to achieve important, clearly defined, and understood? Have all other nonviolent policy means failed? Will military force achieve the objective? At what cost? Have the gains and risks been analyzed? How might the situation that we seek to alter, once it is altered by force, develop further and what might be the consequences?" If the answers to these questions were satisfactory, then clear and unambiguous military objectives, firmly linked with the political objectives, must be given to the armed forces.⁶⁰

Finally, he stated that decisive, overwhelming force should always be the preferred method of using American

military power. Gradualism violates fundamental Napoleonic principles of warfare, may create an illusion of control, and usually fails to defeat a conventional enemy. In his autobiography, he said about Panama,

The lessons I absorbed from Panama confirmed all my convictions over the preceding 20 years, since the days of doubt over Vietnam. Have a clear political objective and stick to it. Use all the force necessary, and do not apologize for going in big if that is what it takes. Decisive force ends wars quickly and in the long run saves lives. Whatever threats we faced in the future, I intended to make these rules the bedrock of my military counsel.⁶¹

Despite his deserved reputation as a forceful proponent of using overwhelming force and as an opponent of deeper involvement in Bosnia, the intellectual gist of Powell's argument actually strayed quite far from the strict criteria of his former boss, Weinberger. Powell went to great lengths to make clear that the questions were not intended as a blueprint for a country's policy on the use of force.⁶² To do so would destroy the ambiguity central to any nation's foreign policy, he said, thereby signaling to our enemies what we will and will not fight for. If it is rational, Powell argued, a government will alter its strategy according to evolving circumstances:

[H]aving a fixed set of rules for how you will go to war is like saying you are always going to use the elevator in the event of fire in your apartment building. Surely enough, when the fire comes, the elevator will be engulfed in flames or, worse, it will look good when you get in it only to fill with smoke and flames and crash a few minutes later. But do you stay in your apartment and burn to death because your plan calls for using the elevator to escape, and the elevator is untenable? No, you run to the stairs, an outside fire escape, or a window. In short, your plans to escape should be governed by the circumstances of the fire when it starts.⁶³

Powell went on to argue that not only can we not stipulate ahead of time whether the use of force is warranted, but *how* U.S. forces are used is also open to

interpretation in the light of extant circumstances. Decisive force should always be preferred, while surgical air bombings and other limited attacks should be treated skeptically. The latter should not be rejected out of hand, however:

This is not to argue that the use of force is restricted to only those occasions where the victory of American arms will be resounding, swift, and overwhelming. It is simply to argue that the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue. . . .

When we do use American forces, we should not be equivocal: we should win and win decisively. If our objective is something short of winning—as in our air strikes into Libya in 1986—we should see our objective clearly, then achieve it swiftly and efficiently.

Powell again acknowledged the success of limited military and humanitarian operations in Somalia, Liberia, the Philippines, Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, and Bosnia.⁶⁴

Powell's argument is therefore quite different and more sophisticated than what has come to be accepted as the Powell doctrine.⁶⁵ The Powell *argument* favors a “logical process” before committing U.S. forces. Leaders should ask the difficult questions about the value of their objectives, the costs, gains, and risks of achieving those objectives, and lean toward decisive force when relevant. They should be sure the benefits outweigh the costs. But leaders cannot reasonably announce ahead of time what they will or will not do. Nor should they rule out the limited use of force.

President Bush mirrored these remarks in a speech at West Point just before leaving office in January 1993. He argued that neither interests nor hard-and-fast criteria were sufficient guidelines for using force. Instead, policymakers needed judgment, based on a case-by-case analysis, while keeping in mind five principles. Force

should be used, the President said, “where the stakes warrant, where and when force can be effective, where no other policies are likely to prove effective, where its application can be limited in scope and time, and where the potential benefits justify the potential costs and sacrifice.” In every case, “it will be essential to have a clear and achievable mission, a realistic plan for accomplishing the mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the mission is complete.” International support will be sought but is not a prerequisite. “Sometimes a great power has to act alone. . . .”⁶⁶

Bush stressed that “the question of military intervention requires judgment. Each and every case is unique.” Like Powell, he claimed that to

adopt rigid criteria would guarantee mistakes involving American interests and American lives. And it would give would-be troublemakers a blue-print for determining their own actions. It could signal U.S. friends and allies that our support was not to be counted on.⁶⁷

Inherent in the Powell-Bush way of thinking is the tension between the desire to set out clear limitations on the use of force, and the acceptance of the view that in some cases limited force can be used successfully for a variety of ends. The limitations arise from the reason “why generals get nervous”: “[W]hen so-called experts suggest that all we need is a little surgical bombing or a limited attack” and the desired ends are not met, “a new set of experts then comes forward with talk of a little escalation.”⁶⁸ Such dynamics could eliminate the needed limitations on scope, and also can destroy a meaningful relationship between political objectives and military goals.

On the other hand, the acknowledgement that some uses of limited force are valid derives from an acceptance that force will be used to promote less-than-vital interests in the post-Cold War world. As Bush put it,

we cannot always decide in advance which interests will require our using military force to protect them. The relative importance of an interest is not a guide: Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital.”⁶⁹

This affirmation of the relevance of force for interests that are not related to the very survival of the country opens many doors, which, in the absence of judgment and logical decision processes, can lead to disaster.

Clear proponents of this school of thought are few and far between. Eliot Cohen has written that prudence will always be required in decisions on military intervention. An administration must ask, “What price would the United States pay for intervening, and what for refraining?”⁷⁰ Richard Haass has argued more extensively for this school of thought. A former speechwriter for Bush and now Director of Policy Planning in the State Department for President George W. Bush, Haass claims that “interests are only a guide,” “neither victory nor an exit date should be prerequisites,” “popular and congressional support are desirable but not necessary,” the early use of force is preferable to the later use, and overwhelming force is better than gradualism. He notes that there is no substitute for judgment.⁷¹

Assessing the Powell-Bush Argument. Powell and Bush accepted that the nation would be fighting for less-than-vital interests. While Powell always resisted this in practice, Bush ordered the humanitarian operation in Somalia, thereby setting an important precedent. The President also spoke favorably of intervening “where the stakes warrant.” By implication these stakes were different than strictly vital interests, but the Powell-Bush approach provides little resolution to the problem of which interests are worth the expenditure of what costs in terms of lives and resources. This central problem remains subject to debate under the Powell-Bush approach. Before Operation DESERT STORM, President Bush chose to allow the debate

to occur in public and, formally, in Congress. Before Operation DESERT SHIELD and Somalia, the debate, such as existed, was private and internal.

This approach also does not offer a guide to the level of costs and risks that will be considered acceptable or excessive in any given set of circumstances. Nor does it help policymakers discern between short- and long-term costs and risks, or how different kinds of risks should be valued by decisionmakers (for example, between the cost in American lives and the danger of developments in other theaters). These important issues are left malleable, subject to the strategic context and political interpretation.

In the absence of clearer guidelines, some interpretations will be detrimental to effective policy. An example is the primary role that the “zero casualties” mindset has come to play in planning for peace operations. In that absence of a broad-based consensus on the value of the operations themselves, the Clinton administration chose to protect itself from criticism (and the missions from rejection) through avoiding casualties at all costs.⁷²

A third distinguishing feature of this school concerns the notion that “victory” may have varied definitions. For the strict criteria school of Weinberger, the great lesson learned in Vietnam was, as Weinberger put it in 1986, “We must never again commit U.S. forces to a war we do not intend to win.”⁷³ Leaving aside the accuracy of this statement, in the Powell-Bush view, this attitude is replaced with the “careful matching of military and political goals,” the achievement of which may or may not be swift.

“Matching” implies that the use of military force should accomplish the political goals at which it is aimed. The issues of how, at what cost, within what time frame, and how completely political goals should be accomplished, are not addressed. Nor does this approach address the problem of unclearly defined political goals such as those that are inherent in humanitarian and peace operations. Nevertheless, the approach acknowledges that victory may

have many faces, and, for new challenges, may defy traditional interpretations.

Fourth, force may be used before other instruments of power are exhausted, in this view, for the last resort clause of the Strict Criteria school is also modified in this approach. In Bush's view, the military should be used if it is the best tool for the job, regardless of whether it is the last tool reached for. Here he echoed Shultz in claiming that holding back force as a last resort makes it more likely that force will be needed, and by implication that the early use of limited force may prevent the need for more massive force later.

The Powell argument, then, calls for a logical process of assessment and the matching of military power to political ends, while it relaxes the Weinberger criteria that vital national interests must be at stake, that clear military victory is always relevant, and that public support must be clear ahead of time. Bush—unlike Powell—also relaxed the criteria that force must be a last resort. The proclamation of and rigid adherence to clear and strict criteria are rejected.

This is not to argue that in his capacity as CJCS Powell always adhered to this argument as opposed to the more dogmatic interpretation of his doctrine. Powell used his political weight to shape policy to an extent that many have found troublesome.⁷⁴

This discussion points to the need to further define the kinds of interests that are worth fighting for, and how the national security bureaucracy can better match means and ends. Bush and Powell appear to believe that these two issues lie within the purview of the White House. In their memoirs, neither suggests that government reorganization or bureaucracy renewal would result in better or worse decisions on the use of force.

Summary of the Four Approaches, and Why Retrenchment Is Not an Option.

The four main approaches to using force, put forth by various administrations, officials, and analysts since the early 1980s, are summarized in Table 1. They are shaped by different bureaucratic, political, and individual experiences and are based upon different assumptions concerning the proper uses of the military institution, broadly conceived, in the furtherance of foreign policy aims.

Approach (Advocates)	Purpose of Military Force	Criteria To Be Met Before Using Force	Criteria for Police Force Employment
Strict Criteria (Weinberger, others)	Deterrence of and readiness for major war. Decisive military victory	Vital national interest Clearly defined political and military objectives Willingness of U.S. and allies to commit sufficient forces to win Assured public support Other instruments of power have failed ("last resort")	Reassess as necessary Avoid gradualism: win Size forces to achieve objectives
Intuitive Interventionism (Shultz, Albright)	Coercive diplomacy Preemption Deterrence (of terrorism) Conventional operations	Assessment of appropriateness for achieving foreign policy goals	Prepare legal, diplomatic, political, international fronts to ensure success Develop exit strategy
Criteria Overload/ Sliding Scale (Clinton administration)	Support an array of foreign policy goals-- democratization, coercive diplomacy, humanitarian missions. Fight and win major wars	Possible reasons: Defend against attack on U.S. or ally Counter aggression Defend economic interests Promote or defend democracy Prevent spread of WMD, terrorism, international crime, drug trafficking Maintain credibility Humanitarian purposes	Make level of force commensurate with stakes
Logical Process (Powell, Bush)	Fight and win major wars Support an array of foreign policy goals (unspecified)	Assessment that political objective is important, clearly defined, and understood Assessment that military force will achieve objective Assessment that costs, risks, gains will be beneficial to U.S. Anticipation of altered circumstances	Clear and unambiguous military objectives Link military objectives to political objectives Use decisive, overwhelming force if appropriate Have realistic exit strategy

Table 1. Four Approaches to Using Force.

The Shultz-Weinberger debate set the parameters of the discussion, and each side has adherents today. The Clinton administration moved from a posture resembling Intuitive Interventionism to an approach emphasizing the need to consider a multitude of factors before using force. Powell and the Bush administration also shifted their posture from an initial reliance on Weinberger-like strict criteria to what I have labeled the Powell or Powell-Bush argument. Unlike the frequently cited “Powell doctrine,” the argument loosened some of Weinberger constraints and emphasized the matching of political aims and military means.

I have argued that the Weinberger approach in its pure form is not suited to contemporary challenges, and that calls for a return to strict criteria in the service only of near term, obvious and concrete vital interests are misplaced, the justifications often are based on mistaken historical analogy. The Weinberger Doctrine is more appropriately considered a defense policy than a foreign policy, and in its most restrictive guise, it violates the principle that military power should serve policy. The Intuitive Interventionist approach, on the other hand, may mislead policymakers into using military force in inappropriate situations and in a costly fashion. The Clinton administration attempt to “split the difference” did not provide a helpful basis for future action. The Powell-Bush approach is a good start.

Before proceeding, we should address a different argument favoring a general policy of nonintervention for which the Weinberger approach might also be invoked. Some have argued for a general retrenchment from global activism not to conserve military power for its own sake, but because an activist agenda is counterproductive. Samuel Huntington claims that America has lost its sense of identity and of important national interests. The loss of a clear enemy together with the capture of foreign policy by special interests mean it is better to retrench and wait for the emergence of clear threats than to go down a path from which it will be difficult to depart.⁷⁵ Richard Betts similarly

asks whether retreat is not the best defense against what he considers the real threat to American security, an attack on the homeland using WMD. He argues that interventionism breeds enemies.⁷⁶ Ivan Eland of the Cato Institute argues that the United States should adopt a policy of military restraint in order to reduce the incentive for asymmetric attacks.⁷⁷ And Ronald Steele makes a related argument although from a very different point of view. He claims that the United States has never been as secure as at present, and that nervousness about global developments arises from an inability to relax rather than the nature of the problems.⁷⁸

With regard to intervention in particular, Joseph Nye argues for U.S. abstinence in non-“A-” and “B-list” crises, which invoke challenges to vital or important national interests. “What is striking is how the ‘C-list’ has come to dominate today’s foreign policy agenda.” Kosovo and Rwanda belong in this category, in Nye’s view. Nonvital cases “like Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo continue to force their way to the foreground because of their ability to command massive media attention.”⁷⁹ Edward Luttwak argues that in any case outside intervention merely postpones peace and perpetuates war.⁸⁰ Both authors cite public pressure and media coverage as main culprits in leading to U.S. and U.N. intervention.

There is, as Nye puts it, a pool of “strong moral preferences” among the American public. In 1999, for example, 74 percent of the American public favored U.S. air strikes against terrorist training camps, and 57 percent even favored the use of U.S. ground troops for such contingencies.⁸¹ At the height of the Bosnia crisis in the mid-1990s, 58 percent of Americans agreed that the United States had an “obligation to use force” if there were no other way to get aid to civilians.⁸² At the end of 1995 a majority supported Clinton’s decision to send troops to Bosnia. Fully 63 percent thought U.S. troops should be deployed to Bosnia if a wider war would have to be prevented, and 64 percent thought that the humanitarian desire to stop more killing

justified sending U.S. forces.⁸³ Two out of three favored intervening with a large military force if necessary to stop ethnic cleansing. Some of this support came from those who wished to end ethnic conflict; some came from those who wished to ensure a future for NATO; some from those concerned about a wider war and regional instability.⁸⁴

Even more of the public believed the U.N. should have intervened to stop ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, and, if limited means proved ineffective, 62 percent thought the U.N. should have “gone in with a large military force to occupy the country and stop the killings.” Of these individuals, 86 percent favored sending U.S. troops to such an operation. Similarly, in a June-July 1994 poll taken while the genocide was occurring, 60 percent favored setting up safe havens in Rwanda. A strong 62 percent thought the U.N. should send peacekeepers to Burundi, and that the United States should contribute troops, according to the April 1995 poll.⁸⁵

Recent figures buttress this notion of broad public support. Kull argues that between two-thirds and three-quarters of the public have traditionally supported humanitarian operations, and that the United States should provide about 25 percent of the troops for them.⁸⁶ Further evidence of a reservoir of support for limited operations—a reservoir that could become public pressure in the event of what is perceived as a preventable or stoppable disaster—is provided later in the monograph. Here we should note merely that if we acknowledge a number of significant public misperceptions, the foundations for an activist foreign policy may be even stronger than indicated by the above figures. In the late 1990s the public’s median estimate was that 40 percent of U.N. peacekeepers were American; the actual at the time was 4 percent. When asked what the appropriate amount would be, the median response was about 20 percent! Similarly, the median estimate of how much of the U.S. defense budget was spent on peacekeeping was 22 percent, more than 22 times the actual amount. Asked what an

appropriate amount would be, the median response was 15 percent, a vast increase in the actual budget.⁸⁷

Yet this pool of support for humanitarian efforts does not translate directly into foreign policy. Rather, it is an interactive process between media, government, international organizations, and, of course, the crises themselves that explains how the United States considers military intervention. Indeed, it is puzzling that a combination of mass media and mass public pressures continues to be cited as the prime motivators behind interventions. Jonathan Mermin demonstrated some time ago that media coverage does not drive policy unless significant interest groups and governmental coalitions lead media coverage and undertake campaigns of their own. CNN coverage of the Somalia famine in the spring of 1992, for example, had little impact despite its heart-wrenching angle. Only after signals from Washington, including “seven senators, a House Committee, the full House and Senate, the Democratic candidate for president, and the White House” who contacted major networks, did Somalia emerge as a major subject of foreign policy debate.⁸⁸

Were the common understanding of the CNN effect accurate, policymaking would be much simpler. As it is, however, the interactive process means that it is unlikely that dispassionate debate, or even White House leadership or strategy reviews, will be able to eliminate “C-list” military actions.

International developments and other domestic forces also cast doubt on the feasibility of this course. Ethnic and tribal conflict, humanitarian disasters, possible conflicts in Northeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Southeastern Europe, and unexpected developments in terrorism or WMD proliferation will confront this and the next administration. Presidents will view such developments with the common *realpolitik* eye of one who has the ability and responsibility to shape the security environment; they have always done so. Long-term opportunities and the potential opportunity

costs and more immediate losses will move to the fore. Domestic factors will reinforce this inclination to act rather than merely to observe, for administrations must somehow respond to the demands of their constituencies, which provide the legitimacy and political support necessary to govern domestically and to pursue a grand strategy in the foreign realm.⁸⁹ Democrats and Republicans each have significant constituencies concerned with issues that incline them towards recommending force in a variety of situations—egregious human rights abuses, democratization, access to resources, and protection of American lives and property abroad. Perceptions of both threats and moral responsibilities, in other words, continue to support—and could demand—military action.

Furthermore, administrations will frequently perceive a need to anticipate and counter criticism for inaction from their political opposition. This is likely to hold true for whichever party wins the next election: intangible interests such as the need to maintain a domestic constituency for an overarching grand strategy or the need to uphold commitments and reputation will inevitably lead to the deployment of sizable American military forces.⁹⁰

In sum, the norm of roughly a dozen serious conflicts occurring around the globe in any given year is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. It will be impossible for the United States to avoid any involvement all of the time, for reasons residing in public concerns and in presidential leadership as described above.⁹¹

The wisdom of the “retrenchment” course of action is doubtful in any case, because the opportunity costs of inaction are so great. Opportunity costs may be defined as “the value of what these resources could have produced if they had been used in the best alternative way.”⁹² Jacob Heilbrun rightly asks whether any entrepreneur recently successful in vanquishing his main competitor of several decades would suddenly decide to pull back and sell off assets. It would be equally unusual for a national entity to

retrench, rethink strategy, and wait for new challengers to arise.⁹³ Until September 11, 2001, terrorist networks did not appear to justify costly, limited interventions in the minds of most analysts. In retrospect, deeper engagement, even if they would not have brought total victory, would have been wise.

An administration should have the flexibility to respond to a variety of challenges and to avoid missing opportunities for shaping the security environment, while avoiding some of the greater pitfalls of the more activist approaches to the use of force. In the next section, we draw lessons from the existing models and propose an approach—principled judgment.

Some Principles for a U.S. Intervention Policy.

The senior members of the George W. Bush administration entered office as confirmed force-conservers. During the campaign, the president had stated his skepticism of the utility of the use of force, at least in protracted conflicts with limited U.S. national interest at stake. He confirmed this attitude in a February 12, 2001, interview with the American Forces Information Service: “While my administration will honor the commitments previous administrations have made, we will be very sparing in how we commit our troops overseas.”⁹⁴ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has stated his clear preference for fewer limited military operations and to reduce the size of the mission in Bosnia.⁹⁵ Vice President Richard Cheney had, during the first Bush administration, opposed the Somalia operation and in general is viewed as an exponent of the so-called Weinberger-Powell approach.⁹⁶

As Secretary of State, Powell’s reputation preceded him, and, ironically, it is Powell himself who may moderate strict adherence to a force-conserving approach. It is likely that he will reinvigorate the State Department. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage suggests that the government will again have a Secretary of State who is treated as the

first among equals.⁹⁷ As head of a reinvigorated department, Powell will face new roles and responsibilities and be inundated with the views of bureaucracies and other nations that challenge the force-conserving philosophy. Africa has already received a more prominent place on the new administration's agenda than most had expected. And while accounts differ, it is possible that during the planning for the raid on Somali warlord Mohammed Aideed, Powell showed his support for risky military operations that might bring large payoffs. In any case, it is clear that he did not oppose the mission.⁹⁸

Every administration faces unanticipated developments. Most use force in some way. Even before September 11, it was unlikely that the George W. Bush administration would have defied history. After the war on terrorism becomes part of the political landscape, there will again be pressures to intervene—even if to forestall larger, more costly intervention later—when America's broad values and narrow interests are challenged. As Ralph Peters has stated, the United States will continue to become involved in humanitarian and similar operations “because of the nature of the world today and tomorrow.”⁹⁹ The administration knows that it must prepare strategically for these contingencies so that the military can prepare for the operational tasks.

What might a new intervention policy resemble? The discussion above acknowledged useful lessons in each of the four major approaches. The advantages, disadvantages and derivable lessons are summarized in Table 2.

There is insufficient space here to delve into every aspect and lesson of each approach. Instead, I argue that a posture of Principled Judgment should be constructed in two steps. First, policymakers should agree on some basic principles to be adopted in considering the use of force. Second, policymakers should consider several institutional changes that are necessary to ensure the success of an approach based on principled judgment.

Reactive (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Reactive (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances and opportunities to exploit them in order to achieve and sustain a desired state.	Intrinsic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Intrinsic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;
Strategic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Strategic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances and opportunities to exploit them in order to achieve and sustain a desired state.	Intrinsic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Intrinsic (defensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;
Strategic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Strategic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances and opportunities to exploit them in order to achieve and sustain a desired state.	Intrinsic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Intrinsic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;
Offensive (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Offensive (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances	Ability to respond quickly to changes in circumstances and opportunities to exploit them in order to achieve and sustain a desired state.	Intrinsic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;	Intrinsic (offensive); Political; military; Strategic; cultural; Non-lethal;

Table 2. Advantages, Disadvantages, and Derivable Lessons in Each of the Four Major Approaches.

Eight principles in particular should shape decisions on the use of force.¹⁰⁰ If, as Powell argues, “the use of force should be restricted to occasions where it can do some good and where the good will outweigh the loss of lives and other costs that will surely ensue,”¹⁰¹ policymakers will do a better job of estimating the benefits and costs of using force if these changes are instituted. The eight principles follow:

1. Defining national interests: from categories to context.

There are three primary reasons why reference to notions of the national interest will be even more contentious in the future than they have in the past. First, policymakers will reflexively consider “bolt from the blue” crises more in the context in which they arise than in light of prior doctrinal guidance. An instructive lesson is offered by the way in which Secretary of State Dean Acheson viewed the problem of the U.S. response to the North Korean invasion in June 1950. Acheson’s January 1950 speech excluding Korea from the U.S. defensive perimeter in Asia reflected long-established policy backed by the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Forces, the JCS, the State Department, the NSC, and the President.¹⁰² Following several policy reviews, the United States had withdrawn its last remaining troops from South Korea in 1949, despite acknowledging that the North would probably invade and do so successfully. Yet when this happened, the Truman administration decided to use force because the world could see that the United States had the means to influence a situation, the outcome of which could possibly have dire consequences for American prestige and interests.

Plainly, this attack did not amount to a *casus belli* against the Soviet Union. Equally plainly, it was an open, undisguised challenge to our internationally accepted position as the protector of South Korea, an area of great importance to the security of American-occupied Japan. To back away from this challenge, in view of our capacity for meeting it, would be highly destructive of the power and prestige of the United States. By

prestige, I mean the shadow cast by power, which is of great deterrent importance.¹⁰³

Acheson was not saying that the vital interest of Japan would be lost if the United States did not act, but rather that American prestige, influence, and hence the ability to deter other challenges would suffer greatly. When self-proclaimed force conservers point to the need to avoid what they refer to as mere diversions in order to prepare for major battles such as Korea, they should consider the 1950 context that got us into Korea in the first place, for it is relevant to Bosnia and other peace operations today. Pre-existing criteria and strategic assessments based on scenarios of possible wars proved irrelevant, as they should have. Administrations will instead view crises in the context of available means and an estimate of costs and risks, in no small part because allied and domestic constituencies will do so.

The second reason that *a priori* conceptions of the national interest are not a sufficient guide to using force is that the boundaries between traditional categories will not be as clear as they were during the Cold War. Southeastern Europe is a case in point. Bosnia, Kosovo, and Macedonia behold elements of important, less important, peripheral, and humanitarian interests for the United States. Where one falls in this debate depends on one's time horizon, estimates of the impact on great power relations, the implications of refugee flows and destroyed economies, the impact of a variety factors on regional stability, and the importance of a possible "civilizational clash" in this area on regional or world politics. If one believes that over time NATO members could come to blows or that NATO itself could fragment in disagreement over certain developments, then vital interests are at stake as well: it does not make sense, in this view, not to risk lower costs now if they would prevent the loss of vital or highly important interests later.

The third reason has to do with the importance of U.S. reputation, even where there is general agreement that

peripheral and humanitarian interests are the overriding motivations for our concern. Where there is egregious and widespread suffering, and where the United States, among others, has the ability to respond at little cost, inaction will result in a loss of prestige and leadership aura. Powell's interest in the fate of Africa has much to do with this, also. The problems there are so dire that the payoffs from relatively small investments may be dramatic, thus augmenting American prestige and Washington's position of global leadership.

Traditional conceptions were suspect even during the Cold War. Most could agree that the stakes in Vietnam were significant, but whether this warranted a ground war in Asia and, if so, how this war should be fought, were divisive issues. In the Gulf War, too, disagreements existed within the government and administration as to the significance of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and how the United States should respond. Bush's decision to intervene in Somalia was due as much to its simultaneity with the Bosnia crisis—and the view that Somalia could be dealt with much more easily—as to humanitarian concerns.¹⁰⁴

The present salience of the terrorist threat does not solve this problem. The Hart-Rudman Commission concluded in early 2001 that “[s]tates will acquire weapons of mass destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on American soil, possibly in large numbers.”¹⁰⁵ The warning, partially accurate, was not heeded. Within a week of the September 11 attacks, the administration was already divided on the nature of a military response. Dramatic successes due to financial agreements, diplomatic pressures, and political incentives will make disagreements about how to respond militarily even more prominent. Reliance on the vital nature of protecting U.S. citizens will not provide the needed guidelines.

2. Public support is a constructed pillar of foreign policy, not a criterion for action: reinterpreting the lessons of Vietnam and Somalia.

The use of force should not depend upon guarantees of public support. Such a stipulation would have several harmful effects. It would make more likely an “all or nothing” approach to the use of force, since it is usually more difficult to garner support for limited uses of force. This problem is magnified by the sound-bite culture in which foreign policy debates are conducted. Needless to say, this would be a particular danger during an election season.

A priori support might also require whipping up public support to an extent that would unduly constrain policy later by making difficult any limitations on the use of force. While the “overwhelming force” school might appreciate this, political leaders have almost always exhibited concerns for that quagmire. The Johnson administration feared it would lead to an ineffective American invasion of Laos and North Vietnam, at least, and with China and/or the Soviet Union at worst. The Bush administration was concerned that such public pressure would demand a march to Baghdad and a military occupation with unknowable complications.

This approach is especially unwise during periods of strategic change and upheaval. Literate and reasonably well-informed publics in Europe and America refused for an entire decade to see the challenges posed by Nazi and Fascist ideology and power. While the initial response to September 11 was heartening, within days one could hear arguments that U.S. policy brought the disaster upon itself and that militant action would only make matters worse — in other words, appease. Whether the public attitude in America today resembles Europe of September 1939 or of the mid-1930s remains to be seen.

The public needs to be educated and consulted, not handed the keys to policymaking. The framers of the Constitution went to great lengths to prevent the passions

of the people from taking the helm of the ship of state. This should be no less a concern when those passions may prevent the use of force in cases where it is desperately needed.

Finally, it should be clear that in virtually all uses of force, the public initially rallies to support the administration's policies.¹⁰⁶ This is true even in cases in which the President has a high disapproval rating and when losses are dramatic: it is often forgotten that the Korean war claimed several thousand American dead in the first months of fighting. The key then is to sustain this support if the policy is effective. This is entirely feasible if the administration itself understands the reasons why it has embarked on a conflict, for it is then able to communicate these to opinion leaders and the general public. Most importantly, the administration must consult with congressional leaders and seek their support.

Misunderstanding on the issue of public support is largely the result of misinterpretations of the impact of public opinion on the conflicts in Vietnam and Somalia. The U.S. military is only the most vociferous proponent of the interrelated views that the public lost Vietnam, and that public will is insufficient for even the smallest numbers of casualties. Without debating the causes of defeat in Vietnam, one can still point out two critical facts about public opinion in that war. First, a significant proportion of public opinion supported massive escalation and widening of the war from 1965 to well after the 1968 Tet offensive. Second, opinion in favor of withdrawal grew in proportion to the casualties incurred. John Mueller showed that this relationship was common to both wars, and others have shown that support can waver even in the most clear-cut of wars, as in World War II.¹⁰⁷ Finally, in Vietnam major opposition did not prevent escalation of the war and engagement for an additional 4 to 6 years.

Somalia has become even more of a chimera for those who argue that there is no depth to the American will to

pursue limited operations. One can hardly attend an academic, policy, or military conference without hearing the tocsin of October 1993. As the story goes, the death of 18 American serviceman, and perhaps the ruthless exploitation of their deaths by both Somali warlords and the evening news which showed bodies dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, were enough to cause a public outcry against participation in the endeavor and to prompt the setting of an end-date. In reality, public opinion turned against neither the operation nor peacekeeping in general.¹⁰⁸ What caused withdrawal from Somalia were the attacks by Clinton's opposition in Congress, the absence of a strategy for preempting or countering this, and the lack of stomach in the White House for a foreign policy battle. The latter may have been compounded by a lack of clear reasoning regarding the nature and purpose of the American mission in Somalia.

Effective political leadership can have a major impact on how the public interprets the importance of casualties. A unified leadership supporting a particular operation is likely to be reflected in unified public support; divided or significantly opposed portions of leadership will also find a public counterpart.¹⁰⁹ The public generally supports operations other than war and is willing to accept some tens of casualties in humanitarian operations.¹¹⁰

James Anderson has written that the claim that the public will not accept casualties “collapses upon close scrutiny” if the intervention rationale seems justified. He includes in the category of reasonable justifications the protection of vital interests or the aversion of “a preventable humanitarian disaster.” In such cases, the ire of the American public will be directed against the adversary.¹¹¹ A West Point study on public attitudes towards casualties finds that “the American public is quite willing to accept casualties” if leaders persuade them that the mission is in the national interest, and that they will see it through to a successful conclusion.¹¹² Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi hold that additional public opinion polls demonstrate

that the foreign policy elites who believe “that Americans demand a casualty-free victory as the price of supporting any military intervention abroad” are simply wrong. “The general public is far more willing to tolerate combat losses than civilian policymakers—or senior military officers.”¹¹³

The evidence from the period immediately following the September 11 attacks supports the thesis that the public will not shy from casualties. Over 80 percent felt that the United States should take military action even if that meant going to war with a nation that harbors terrorists. More than 90 percent believed the United States should take military action against “whoever is responsible for the attacks.”¹¹⁴

Public support of or acquiescence to military operations is necessary. The most important determinant of public support is not, however, the level of approval before an operation begins, but rather the degree to which leadership can articulate the reasons why the operation serves the national interest. The public is well prepared to support peace operations even if some tens of U.S. casualties are incurred, provided the leadership can explain the importance of the mission. The proper criterion is therefore the willingness and ability of the leadership to explain and justify the intervention.

3. Discard the “last resort” principle.

Prior to September 11, U.S. policy essentially adhered to this principle in its fight against terrorists: use means that we will not incur casualties and, if force is used, see that it, too, does not incur casualties. The quick resort to finger-pointing by both civilians and retired military personnel reveals that the approach is now seen as wrong-headed.¹¹⁵

To Shultz, the last resort principle meant that “by the time of use, force is the *only* resort and likely a much more costly one than if used earlier.”¹¹⁶ Virtually all parties to the debate pay lip service to this principle, but it is both

misguided and impractical. Force may be the appropriate tool for some crises, while economic or other tools may work in others; sequencing has little to do with the efficacy of a solution. Ironically, those who most oppose the gradual application of military force tend to favor the gradual application of the overall might of a nation, beginning with diplomatic approaches, proceeding through economic leverage and possible sanctions, and only in the final analysis concluding that the use of overwhelming force is justified.

This approach is inappropriate for many contemporary problems. An “economic strike” is not likely to be effective at stopping an international terrorist organization with sophisticated political and financial networks. Diplomatic and economic tools not only failed to halt Serb aggression in Bosnia and Kosovo but also may have bolstered domestic support for Milosevic while making the later use of military force more difficult and of questionable utility.¹¹⁷

The pursuit of economic sanctions without preparations for major military action would have been the height of fantasy in trying to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait. More importantly, a “last resort” approach would have squandered the emotion necessary to cement together an improbable coalition. If it continued for long, military draw-downs and events elsewhere may have precluded military action altogether. The result would have been a nuclear Iraq in control of 40 percent of the world’s oil production.

The early use of force is also appropriate for purposes of deterrence and coercive diplomacy. Operation DESERT SHIELD was more effective than unsubstantiated threats would have been for deterring an Iraqi advance into Saudi Arabia. Rapidly deployable ground forces may have deterred or, later, forced a halt to the ethnic cleansing of Kosovar Albanians. As Shultz stated, the doctrine of last resort “means that, by the time of use, force is the *only* resort and likely a much more costly one than if used earlier.”¹¹⁸

Force should not be a first, middle, or last resort out of mere principle. Rather, the circumstances should determine the proper response. Under what conditions will the early insertion of ground troops, or strikes from air and sea, or accurate bombing, prevent various kinds of ethnic or tribal conflict, or coup attempts, or cross-border conflict in Southeastern Europe? For various reasons, neither the academic nor the policy community has examined these in a rigorous fashion. The efficacy of the sequence with which the instruments of national power are used in various kinds of crises deserves further study. A useful start would be to conduct a series of studies examining the conditions under which a range of preemptive or early uses of force are likely to forestall deeper conflict of various types.

4. Redefine “victory” to include foreign policy victories, not only military victories.

In many respects, the Weinberger Doctrine is not a foreign policy statement but a military doctrine. It fits comfortably with the governing military principles of overwhelming force and “going in to win.” In Weinberger’s words, “We cannot fight a battle . . . as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops *not* to win, but just to be there.” If we decide it is necessary to put “*combat* troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are *unwilling* to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.”¹¹⁹

When this concept is adhered to reflexively and superficially, Weinberger’s supporters violate the fundamental principle that a military exists to serve policy, however victory is defined by policy. In major war, where the threats are to vital interests and exist in the near term, “winning” can be defined in largely military terms. Otherwise, objectives will be limited, and both intervention and military doctrine must accept this. Senior military leaders then have an obligation to point out the efficacy or inefficacy of military force given the political objectives, and

senior political leaders have an obligation to acquire the knowledge to understand these military realities. This does not mean that political leaders must accept military conceptions of risk or definitions of “wholeheartedly.” Suggestions are offered below regarding how military and political leaders can agree on appropriate levels of force and political objectives in a changing security environment. The suggestion made above, that the military needs better to make its case for limited contingencies, is relevant here as well.

The war on terrorism has rammed this lesson home. The military may be called upon to perform missions that are costly in terms of lives and readiness and which will not bring a clear victory in the traditional sense of the term. Troops may be inserted for a short period of time only to be withdrawn without the achievement of noticeable progress, and then re-inserted with no guarantee that progress or victory will come this time, either. Civilian and military leaders must achieve a *modus vivendi* based on the likely success of a long, painful war. Apart from first principles, political reality also suggests that the military needs to show some initiative in redefining how its forces can lead to various conceptions of victory. For regardless of party affiliation, the political leadership will always require more flexible definitions of winning than that provided by the military art. For those politicians who believe stability in southeastern Europe is a very important national interest and that massive ethnic cleansing threatened this stability due to the movement of refugees and militaries, the deployment of combat-capable troops is a valid foreign policy instrument. Whether they are in Macedonia or Bosnia, these combat troops are doing something considerably less than “winning” but more than simply “being there,” although in some cases the mission may approach the latter. But unless *deterrence* and *stability* are no longer considered valid strategic objectives and the military a vital tool in those strategies, the “win” principle of the Weinberger Doctrine must be rejected.

There are several other deterrence-and-stability situations in which the military might properly be interjected. They are, of course, vital to our posture in the Asia-Pacific region for a combination of deterrence and stability purposes. Troops in Korea and Okinawa are intended to deter a North Korean attack on South Korea. Yet they also advance a series of other vital American interests. They signal the country's commitment to remain engaged in the region and to prevent naked aggression. They are a tool for dampening military buildups by some of our allies which we believe might inflame tensions.

These troops also may be used for a variety of uncomfortable scenarios that fall between war and peace. A North Korean implosion could lead to a massive humanitarian operation necessary for the relatively peaceful transition to a new order on the peninsula. Under current arrangements, this might require American troops under the command of an American general to operate in the North, most likely under the watchful eye of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). This could be one of the most sensitive operations for the U.S. Army. Invocation of the relevant Weinberger principle will be irrelevant.

5. Discard the “first resort” impulse: Reintegrate military power into grand strategy.

Existing debate on the role of force is hamstrung by linear thinking about the sequencing of force in a series of policy options available to the White House. This is but one symptom of what has been termed a “cold war hangover”—the use of concepts regarding military power and grand strategy that were more appropriate to a bipolar confrontation between two superpowers with vastly different ideologies.¹²⁰ It made sense, in that environment, to lay down a well-spaced row of hurdles ahead of the finish line, which would trigger the decisive use of force.

The contemporary security environment is different. Accordingly, the current administration would do well to re-examine how the military instrument works within the

context of the other elements of national power in supporting a coherent grand strategy. Once an end-state is defined (policy) for a particular issue or region, then we should consider how the elements of national power are coordinated to achieve that end, given our own domestic politics, international conditions and the regional aims of our potential adversaries. As Paul Kennedy wrote in 1991:

The crux of grand strategy lies . . . in the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term . . . best interests. . . . It is not a mathematical science in the Jominian tradition, but an art in the Clausewitzian sense—and a difficult art at that, since it operates at various levels, political, strategic, operational, tactical.¹²¹

In other words, the military is just one element of national power. There is the need to begin the torturous process of creating or reinvigorating other institutions needed to accomplish foreign policy aims where the challenges are less of a conventional military nature and more in the realms of policing abilities, border patrols, economic and industrial infrastructure, and other fundamentals of modern societies.

In areas such as the Balkans and Southwest Asia, bayonets may be good, but sitting on them will not achieve our aims. We cannot continue to assign to the military the socio-economic-political tasks simply because no other agency, at home or abroad, can accomplish them. The other elements of national power must be brought up to the task and convinced that they either need to execute the task themselves or serve as a catalyst to an international coalition of the willing, to include international NGOs.¹²² Within weeks of the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration appears to have assembled the fully array of instruments of national power in the service of destroying terrorist networks.

6. Require clearly defined political objectives, but do not limit political objectives to simple ones; and, closely match political and military objectives, but do not allow military doctrine to shape political strategy.

Clausewitz claimed that no one in their right mind would start a war without knowing what they intended to accomplish and how they intended to accomplish it. This has been interpreted narrowly to mean that political goals must be clear-cut. The archetype of poorly-defined political objectives is usually the Johnson administration's goal of preventing the defeat of South Vietnam by convincing the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong that they could not win. Denying the enemy victory is not an adequate objective, in this view, for it does not allow for military victory, which in turn denies such military principles as concentration, mass, momentum, and attacking the enemy's "center of gravity."

Senior military leaders did not accept this interpretation of events in Vietnam until several years after the defeat. In fact, in the 1960s they espoused the "denial of victory to the enemy" strategy as valid because the alternatives—withdrawal or war throughout Indochina and/or with China—were unacceptable. Some authors have written of solutions that would have brought victory by introducing force more rapidly, or using fewer forces but to "seal off the battlefield," or simply calling for the application, without supplying the details, of overwhelming force. At the time, however, senior military and political leaders faced a highly complex international environment and saw inestimable stakes in the third world. Decolonization, wars of insurgency and "national liberation," and the open Soviet commitment to winning these battles required a solution.

The senior political and military leadership in the 1960s preferred to assume risk by pursuing a strategy aimed at minimizing losses while hurting the enemy. Both sides of the civil-military equation underestimated the enemy's will, misunderstood his ability to adapt operationally and

strategically, and underestimated the number of casualties that would be inflicted upon the U.S. military. The military failed to make this clear by performing a strategic estimate or presenting such findings to highest authority, in large part because they were no more sure of this new, unpredictable situation than were their political masters.¹²³

Future developments are likely to present situations that go far beyond the complexity confronted by military and civilian leaders in the early 1960s. There are competing ideologies based on religion, economic theory, racial notions, and cultural differences. Urbanization, migration, and dramatic technological changes dwarf the decolonization movement. Emerging military technologies offer promise of new strategies. And there are many aspiring or actual regional powers with strong incentives to interfere in other nations' affairs.

The military instrument of national power will continue to be used as a tool in dealing with these complexities. As a result, definitions of political objectives will grow in subtlety, to the understandable consternation of the military should they be given the lead in accomplishing those objectives. There must be a retreat from the notion that it is possible to disassociate power from policy, or to use military power without attendant risks of prolonged involvement, unanticipated political and military developments, and significant casualties. Victories in the Gulf War and in Panama have been interpreted, erroneously, to mask these realities and to lay out faulty blueprints for the use of force.¹²⁴

For their part, political leaders must do two things. First, they must make a clear case that military force is likely to achieve a substantial portion of their goals in a reasonable amount of time, variables that can be discussed and debated. Second, they must more honestly acknowledge the risk to other theaters and contingencies caused by these limited uses of force.

7. Address the issues of likely duration and likely costs up front and publicly.

Before the major escalatory decisions on Vietnam in 1964 and 1965, Under Secretary of State George Ball presented graphs and charts demonstrating the strong correlation between increased casualties and decreased public support during the Korean War. Johnson and his advisors did not so much disagree with the facts as they grasped at other information and advice suggesting that the war could be concluded in a relatively short period of time and without making what they referred to as an onerous “Korea-type commitment.”

Bush must not make the same mistake in the war on terrorism. History shows that when faced with high levels of uncertainty and difficult value trade-offs, policymakers have a tendency to take an unrealistically optimistic view of the costs and risks of using force. The march north in Korea, the Bay of Pigs, and the Clinton administration’s approach to the Kosovo conflict are additional examples of such reasoning.¹²⁵ This phenomenon is doubly tempting in cases of intervention in civil or ethnic conflict because it is even more difficult to justify the costs and risks of military action to domestic audiences when traditional threats to traditionally conceived interests are remote. A clear example of this would be the Clinton administration’s rosy predictions of an early exit from Bosnia following the Dayton accords.

The alternative approach of worst-case analysis is only slightly more helpful. It was effective when the prior Bush administration had to plan and justify the supply of troops to the Persian Gulf. However, worst-case thinking can lead to the *absence* of realistic estimation and planning as well. Some claim that this was the case during the early years of the Bosnian conflict.

In any governmental reorganization, there should be greater institutional incentives for the generation of estimates regarding the accomplishment of political goals in

operations other than war. If incentives are not created or do not work, there should be a legally mandated solution that requires civil-military cooperation on a range of contingencies. Until now, the sources of such estimates have swung wildly between the military and civilians, and the quality has been equally uneven. In Bosnia and Kosovo today, the West is confronted with the results of failing to do such realistic estimates. We have avoided addressing fundamental causes of the conflicts, and the limitations of relatively superficial political restructuring are staring NATO in the face.

If duration and costs are underestimated for conventional wars, the public will almost always rally behind their government for an extended period.¹²⁶ Administrations do not have this cushion for humanitarian and related smaller scale contingencies. Even had relations between the early Clinton administration and the military not been strained, the deaths of 18 soldiers on a mission for which the public was not prepared would likely have led to similar calls for withdrawal. Public support for U.S. strategy was more important to the accomplishment of the overall mission than specific military hardware. Because the White House did not prepare the public for the tactical risks that were being taken in support of the strategy, support withered with the first substantial casualties. A realistic understanding of the depths of what is required to halt or prevent war, or to rebuild a society after it, is necessary for both success on the ground and support at home.

8. Clarify the desired endstate and build public support around this, not around a departure date.

The American preference for unambiguous outcomes has been transposed to limited wars and operations other than war. It is seen clearly in the growing displeasure over a continued presence in the Gulf and in Bosnia. In fact, the field of strategic analysis devotes much more energy to

choosing and fighting wars than to waging battles that look “beyond the war to the subsequent peace.”¹²⁷

The United States traditionally has worried little about how to end wars, trusting instead in a first principle of strategic analysis, that the conduct of the war should be organically tied to the solution. In the current environment, however, the judicious ending of conflicts may become nearly as important as the judicious application of power during it. The Gulf War, for example, was a relatively simple case, yet its termination was complex and problematic. The four national goals declared by Bush had been achieved within 100 hours of ground war. Yet the President shut down the operation when he did because he was shocked at the imagery of the “highway of death.” More importantly, the government apparently was convinced that the American public would be shocked and disgusted to the point of questioning America’s war aims. This appears to have been a misjudgment.¹²⁸ Furthermore, there were major problems in communication between policymakers, the theater commander, and ground force commanders. General H. Norman Schwarzkopf apparently did not know the extent of the Iraqi escape, while ground commanders claim he did not solicit the necessary information.¹²⁹

In Kosovo and similar wars, the quality of information is much lower, and the goals are less traditional. In Bosnia, the lack of high-level attention to, and public debate regarding, end-states leads to the perpetuation of a militarized strategy, a dearth of public support for that strategy, and military reticence to develop forces that might be more appropriate to operations other than war but for which a fickle political leadership might withdraw support. It also helps to preclude the development of nonmilitary organizations that will be necessary for the full withdrawal from these devastated areas.¹³⁰

There are also good reasons for not clarifying the conditions for war termination. At home, it opens an administration to criticisms that its military and political

goals, strategies, tactics are misguided. For this reason, political leaders may attempt to “get the camel’s nose under the tent” and gain public support through underestimating the duration or costs of an operation. Again, the Clinton administration’s optimistic portrayal of an early withdrawal from Bosnia is relevant here. Clear statements of the conditions for termination may also yield some initiative to our enemies, who may seek to manipulate world opinion or make false offerings of compromise.

In short, war termination will become more complex and require better long-term planning between civilian and military branches. The more first principles are dealt with appropriately, the more support there will be for seeing a conflict through to its proper strategic conclusion.

INSTITUTIONALIZING BETTER JUDGMENT: INFORMATIONAL, ORGANIZATIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL RENEWAL

Judgment is the ability to form an opinion or evaluation by discerning and comparing, by seeing clearly what is obscure, or by distinguishing and selecting what is appropriate. In decisions to use force, judgment requires much more than simply the application of capabilities. It involves gathering, weighing, and assessing a large amount of information relative to the military and political situation in the target country and at home.

Recent history reveals that most U.S. administrations—regardless of party affiliation or the nature of the crisis—have struggled with exercising good judgment in this sense. Vietnam is usually held up as the archetype of ill-informed judgment on the part of senior political and military leaders,¹³¹ but the record reveals serious problems both before and after Vietnam. In 1950 Truman made his critical decision to deploy combat troops based on extraordinarily unrealistic estimates of the number of ground forces that would be necessary to save South Korea. Ten years after Vietnam, the Reagan

administration sent Marines into a complex civil war in Lebanon with the flawed and, more importantly, unexplored strategic concept that U.S. forces can deter by intimidation and dedicated firepower. This led to a tragic loss of life and to military and diplomatic withdrawal.

The general pattern continued after the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. In 1991 the Bush administration sent 20,000 troops to Somalia but probably did not appreciate the depth and complexity of the famine. Upon inheriting it, an inexperienced Clinton national security team compounded the problem by pursuing nation-building without building the requisite political support, leading to a tragic loss of life and retrenchment. In the 1999 Kosovo war, the United States and NATO alike appeared unprepared for Serbia's response and staying power, nor did they consider early and seriously enough alternatives to air power. Failure was a very near thing.¹³²

American policymakers have labored in various degrees of darkness for three reasons. One is intellectual rigidity brought on by the Cold War and, to a significant extent, by victory in the Gulf a decade ago. A second is the current institutional arrangements that prevent such information from reaching those in need of it. A third is the unfulfilled demand for an increasing range and depth of expertise and of information necessary to intervene successfully. The following suggestions are intended either to circumvent these problems or to change them.¹³³

Intellectual Adjustments.

The decisive nature of victory in the Gulf War, together with its timing at the end of the Cold War, helped to freeze in place a considerable amount of old thinking regarding the use of force. Perspectives that served us well during the Cold War, when we could not help but focus on the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, have performed a disservice since then by blurring “defense” and “national security” into one inappropriate concept.¹³⁴ There has been

for nearly a decade the lingering notion that national security equates to military policy, and that military power is appropriate only for fighting the nation's wars. As a result, we still do not have a comprehensive policy for addressing nontraditional challenges to national security.

How did this occur? Complex organizations frequently become prisoner to their own successes. This occurs because established procedures and routines bring repeated apparent success, but success is due more to expert competency and returns to scale rather than to the adoption of superior methods.¹³⁵ Organizations frequently persist in old methods despite the difference in potential between new approaches and old. Eventually new challenges may be so extraordinary that ordinary approaches do not suffice or are extremely costly.

To varying degrees, such “competency traps” bedevil the U.S. military services and also plague the national security establishment as a whole. Both achieved tremendous successes in their primary tasks throughout the Cold War, which included, above all, the deterrence of global war and improving the wealth and security of the free world. The Gulf War, and our continuing reference back to it after 10 years, demonstrated the military’s success at its core competency, while almost simultaneously the end of the Cold War demonstrated the same for the national security establishment as a whole.

Eliot Cohen and John Gooch wrote in 1990 that there is a “proclivity of large and successful military organizations to see all wars as pretty much the same . . . military organizations must seek out the most difficult kind of intelligence—knowledge of themselves.”¹³⁶ A similar argument could be made about the broader national security establishment. Design flaws may have caused problems that looked like ripples during the Cold War, but these flaws will become much more significant in an environment that requires new thinking and coordinated planning.¹³⁷

Furthermore, competency traps at the military and governmental levels spilled over into the public realm. Cold War thinking on the use of force adhered in the post-Cold War period into two convenient archetypes during the 1990s. For those falling on the active interventionist, frequently Democratic side of the aisle, military force came to be viewed as a panacea for all forms of concerns now deemed to be national security. Throughout the 1990s that traditional keeper of national security, our military, was applied to everything from nation-building to refugee control. As noted above, official documents during the Clinton period expanded the scope of national security by a huge margin to include a variety of human security issues.¹³⁸

The liberal archetype of this thinking was a failure. But its counterpart is equally problematic for U.S. foreign policy. The conservative form of the Cold War mindset is to view the military as a force meant only to fight conventional wars against conventional challenges to the national interest, narrowly construed. Defined as such, the maintenance of an unstressed military becomes an end in itself, ironically mirroring the Clinton “force protection as policy” position.

Neither archetype has served the nation well. The Clinton approach used the military to exhaustion. The Weinberger approach is, in the words of General Anthony Zinni, a recipe for being “able to fight no war other than World War II.”¹³⁹ Not only is that highly unlikely over the near term, but the opportunity costs of preparing only for its possibility loom increasingly large. Analysts legitimately begin to wonder why “shaping the environment” involves only the nonuse of military force.

No matter where one falls on the spectrum between these two positions, we are all recovering Cold War thinkers. The Bush administration has the unusual opportunity to shape intervention and military doctrine in the direction either of sustaining the mindset or of

transitioning to a new era and with a concomitant new understanding about the maintenance of national security. To do the latter, then, we must reconsider how national power fits in grand strategy, realizing that military power is but one tool whose objectives will necessarily be limited for the foreseeable future.

Organizational Changes at the Top.

Institutional changes can also contribute to improved judgment on use-of-force decisions. One fundamental problem is that, as currently organized under Goldwater-Nichols, top-level debate on strategic concepts suffers from the twin requirements of *responsiveness* to the President and the need for eventual *consensus*. When intervention decisions are top-down, President-driven processes, the advisory system frequently has no authority to make him think twice. When crises unfold more slowly, the system as currently organized harmfully limits the range of debate.

The base of expertise must be expanded and given a degree of independence from the NSC on strategic issues. Both issues—expansion and independence—might be dealt with through a *President's Advisory Board on the Use of Force*.¹⁴⁰ Consisting of a mix of retired military and diplomatic officers and regional and functional experts, the body would provide perspective, “second” thoughts, and strategic advice. A degree of insulation from politics could be ensured through staggered memberships that span biennial elections and even administrations.

Like the Council of Economic Advisers or the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the President’s Advisory Board on the Use of Force would have a small staff of experts, rely heavily on its reputation for specialized knowledge and independence, produce reports that cannot be ignored, and influence debate through regularized meetings with key players. Congress would have to agree on

a bipartisan identity for the board and see that it is staffed and led by individuals of the highest integrity.

In addition to the increasing complexity of decisions, new threats may require decision processes that are increasingly secretive and rapid, thereby making it more likely that they will be defective. The 1998 bombing of Sudan may have been based on questionable information and an incomplete airing of views. Yet the nature of the operation and the seriousness of the threat required closely-held deliberations. The war on terrorism has many of the same requirements. Just as World War II drew on expertise from all segments of business, education, and government, so this war will require input from historians, social scientists, natural scientists, sociologists, and religious experts, among others. A President's Advisory Board on the Use of Force would help guard against the unhealthy narrowing of views or the premature foreclosure of options.

Other options that should be pursued include the expansion of representation on the NSC¹⁴¹ and the return to a more Cabinet-centered foreign policy.¹⁴² The former would help marginally while the latter is a laudable goal that will require a new National Security Act.

Expertise: Growing Civil and Military Strategists.

I have argued that it is unreasonable to expect that the small number of individuals now participating in use-of-force decisions should understand how U.S.-levied force will affect problems as diverse as ethnic conflict, famine, clan warfare, organized terrorism, the deterrence of the production, distribution or use of WMD, or the use of military power to halt refugee flows. Yet successive defense reorganization laws dating from the 1950s progressively have narrowed the group that attends to these modern problems and trends.

Compounding this problem of a narrow range of advice is the background and training of the deciders. Many political

leaders and appointees have a limited understanding of the laws of war in any situation, much less how they apply to current limited operations and operations other than war. The military has a small but select number of individuals with extensive experience in these operations. During the 8 years of the Clinton administration, however, the military was in a state of suspension regarding how these operations were to fit into the entire range of tasks for which they might be called. The military needed experts in limited operations but was not sure how much effort to put into the endeavor. This growing demand for new expertise has been recognized previously, as when during the Reagan years the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict attempted to kindle congressional interest to ensure that professional military education met this demand.

In order to grow experts across all the bureaucracies required for the coherent and effective use of military force in limited, complex operations and to promote better cooperation among them, the administration should establish a *National Civil-Military Training Institute*. Such an institution would bring together early- and mid-career individuals who are likely to have a future at the strategic level. It would house a curriculum and practicum built around the kinds of knowledge and tasks likely to be faced by future leaders. This would require a unique faculty and, to a significant extent, a new curriculum, one that examines how civil, military, and other factors have interacted through history over a wide range of phenomena.

Decisions on using force have always required the dexterous integration of knowledge about things political, military, economic, and social. Emerging problems, from urban warfare to preemptive strikes against terrorists, will make this even more challenging. By beginning to build a knowledge base around such problems, future leaders will gain experience early in the multifaceted nature of threatening, applying, and avoiding force.

The integration of military with nonmilitary expertise *after* an intervention begins may be even more demanding in nonconventional conflicts than in more typical ones. Implementation requires the same kind of expertise and knowledge pool—and for longer periods of time—as is required for the initial decisions themselves. The Civil-Military Institute would train and provide this kind of product for longer operations. Such an institute may have made a difference in how the U.S. mission in Somalia evolved, for example, in the spring and summer of 1993. This institute would fill a major gap in the education of future military and civilian officers. It would also capture valuable experiences and use them for training future leaders, whereas current educational and career tracks do not necessarily do so.

As important, the institute would be a way to capture the best from other professions that are necessary to good decisions and their implementation. This includes individuals from scientific, academic, and public policy fields. At present, there is no training or education institution to attract and retain such individuals directly to government service. Young scientists with an interest in alleviating water shortages or protecting troops from chemical attack, for example, may work through the military or for a research facility with a government contract or for a public policy school. However, there is no institution that brings together on a semi-permanent basis individuals from all professions relevant to use-of-force decisions and operations, which focuses study on these problems as a matter of course and which provides professional contacts and opportunities.

Search for Bipartisanship on Intervention Policy.

Ultimately, the bridge between force-conserving and a mainly force-proponent schools of thought must be found in the Congress. The Congress is the fulcrum point between the media, public opinion, and the White House. It can

promote as well as terminate intervention—it managed to do both in Somalia—and it will determine how much of the strategy review's recommendations on force structure to accept or reject.

There is room for bipartisan support. Republican and Democratic administrations and members of the Congress have found agreement on both supporting and denying humanitarian missions and for strikes against terrorism. This base should be expanded for other developments. Rather than wait until a crisis, the administration should begin to work with congressional leaders to forge minimal bipartisan agreement on intervention responses and the tools necessary for executing them. While significant portions of the parties are far apart on these questions, there is also considerable overlap. Certainly, on some basic issues such as stability in the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia, they are no more distant than over aspects of the budget, health care, and education. Bush should renew the spirit of bipartisan cooperation announced upon his assuming office and use intervention issues as one node of contact.

Conclusion and Implications for the Army.

Principled Judgment is, in part, a philosophical approach to the use of force and, in part, a series of guideposts. There is in it an element of ad hoc-ery to the extent that “judgment” outweighs the guiding light of “principles.” Yet previous approaches have lacked both an appreciation of the importance of judgment as well as an acknowledgment that old categories no longer obtain. The government at large and the general public require some understanding of what has changed since the fall of the Soviet Union. For their part, administrations—senior political and military leaders who work together to decide when and how to use force—should acknowledge that the upper reaches of the system could use some institutional innovation in order to improve decisions when judgment

beckons. It is hoped that this combination of realistic principles and institutional renewal will lead to wider political agreement on when and how to use force.

The George W. Bush administration entered office on the force-conserver end of the spectrum of approaches to the use of force. Initial guidelines emerging from the Office of the Secretary of Defense emphasized four objectives: the assurance of friends and allies; the “dissuading” of future adversaries; deterrence and the successful opposition at attempts at coercion of the United States; and the defeat of adversaries should deterrence fail.¹⁴³

Yet it is likely that public and congressional pressure will demand responses to some crises, and that members of this administration—as in all previous—will find that the moral and reputational aspects of some situations require action. The Powell or Powell-Bush argument, as opposed to the Powell doctrine, will prove more relevant in the long run. In addition, there is always the possibility of a major, as yet unforeseen regional conflict. Rumsfeld has wondered aloud

what name of a country or what word for a military capability wasn’t mentioned during my confirmation hearings 4 months ago that within a year could come up and dominate our lives....
(This is) the kind of thing that has happened every 5- or 10-year period in my lifetime.¹⁴⁴

Terrorism, the first shock to the administration’s plans, is the crisis of the moment. Yet even without September 11, and after the terrorist networks are essentially disrupted or destroyed, this combination of likely public pressure, unforeseen regional developments, and the inherent flexibility in the Powell-Bush Argument mean that the Army will have to be prepared to execute missions of a limited nature and intensity. This is particularly important because, since 1989, Army buying power has decreased 37 percent and Army modernization funding, 41 percent. The funding squeeze points to the importance of coordinating the political leadership’s intervention strategy with service requirements to execute that strategy.

Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki has stated that the Army “must train soldiers and leaders to adapt readily to conditions across the spectrum of military operations and build organizations capable of attaining dominance at every point on that spectrum.” He recognizes that this spectrum will likely include contingencies ranging from traditional conflict “to the instability caused by the collapse of states unable to meet the strains of resource scarcity, population growth, and ethnic and religious militarism. . . . As the number of potential challenges increases, the requirements for U.S. landpower will also continue to increase.” The Army’s first two Initial Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) will provide organizational and conceptual models for rounding out the Interim Force. Together with the Interim Armored Vehicle, the Army will proceed until its transformed, Objective Force is able to maintain the same kind of dominance across the future spectrum of violence as it was able to guarantee under the traditional, two-major-theater-war scenario.¹⁴⁵ The war on terrorism should accelerate these innovations.

Beyond maintaining dominance across the future spectrum of violence, policymakers and senior military leaders will have to grapple together with reactions to developments in friendly countries, on the borders of allies, in states that affect regional stability, or in failing states in which there could be a massive humanitarian crisis. As Steven Metz has argued, the nature of future conflict is likely to include a significant number of limited, ambiguous, cross-cultural operations, rather than having either a predominantly traditional or predominantly humanitarian hue.¹⁴⁶ This will require some efforts at anticipating these developments, preempting them or preventing their spread, and responding with a coordinate civil-military-social plan that will allow withdrawal upon early success. The goal is to provide realistic plans for long-term resolution of the problem for which the United States intervenes, thereby making possible the early withdrawal of troops. The role of ground forces is central to efforts along each of these

dimensions of anticipation, preemption and prevention, and intervention.

Finally, future crises will require skill sets that in some cases diverge from those involved in fighting and winning the nation's major wars. Policymakers must recognize that the Army requires the resources to develop and train with these skills even as it maintains responsibility for more traditional tasks.

ENDNOTES

1. For a wide-ranging discussion of the many attitudes towards interventionism that I have here grouped into two main camps, see "American Power—For What? A Symposium," in *Commentary*, January 2000. Other summaries of the debate are found in Richard N. Haass, *Intervention: The Use of Military Force in the Post-Cold War World*, Rev. Ed., Brookings Institution, 1999, Chapter 1; Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives with Force: Military Criteria for Humanitarian Intervention*, Brookings Institution, 1997; Forum in *The National Interest*, Winter 1999/2000. See also, "Why and When to Go In," *Economist*, January 6, 2001; Michael Ignatieff, "The Next President's Duty to Intervene," *New York Times*, February 13, 2000, p. 17; "What in the World?" *U.S. News and World Report*, April 24, 2000, p. 18; Charles B. Shotwell and Kimberly Thachuk, "Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Legitimacy," Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Security Studies, July 1999; Alexander Haig, Jr., "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention," Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2001; The Commission on America's National Interests, *America's National Interests*, July 2000.

2. Speech by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger at National Press Club, November 28, 1984, in Department of Defense News Release No. 609-84, also reprinted in *The Baltimore Sun*, December 3, 1984.

3. Caspar Weinberger, *Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon*, Warner Books, 1990, p. 159.

4. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, Washington, DC, February 1, 1984, Executive Summary, p. 7.

5. John Hillen, "American Military Intervention: A User's Guide," *The Backgrounder*, Heritage Foundation, May 2, 1996, p. 4; David Fromkin, "Don't Send in the Marines," *New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1994, pp. 36-37; Ronald Steel, "Beware the Superpower

Syndrome," *New York Times*, April 25, 1994, p. A15; Richard N. Haass, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 43-58, 56; Anthony Cordesman, interview in *Defense News*, February 28-March 6, 1994, p. 30.

6. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994, p. 833.

7. Hillen, n.5, pp. 4-5.

8. Ambassador David Abshire, Opening Remarks, "Presidential Decisionmaking and the Use of Force," George Bush Presidential Library, College Station, TX, October 24, 1999.

9. See David Fromkin, "Don't Send in the Marines," *New York Times Magazine*, February 27, 1994, pp. 36-37; Ronald Steel, "Beware the Superpower Syndrome," *New York Times*, April 25, 1994, p. A15; Richard K. Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994, pp. 20-33.

10. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, Washington, DC, February 5, 1986, p. 81.

11. Kissinger, p. 658.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 632.

13. Stephen Ambrose writes that Eisenhower "set about building the support he would need to withstand the strident demands for intervention that he knew would come when Dien Bien Phu fell. He did so by putting conditions on American involvement. They were deliberately created to be impossible of fulfillment . . ." Ambrose, *Eisenhower the President*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984, p. 177.

14. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, Washington, DC, February 1, 1984, pp. 17-26.

15. Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. LXIV, Spring 1986, pp. 676-690.

16. George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*, New York: Scribner's, 1993, p. 329.

17. John Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*, New York: Wiley, 1973.

18. See "Ladenese Epistle: Declaration of War," *Washington Post Online*, at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A4342-2001Sep21.html>.

19. For a discussion of rational risk aversion that can lead to suboptimal results, see Douglas J. Macdonald, "Falling Dominoes and System Dynamics: A Risk Aversion Perspective," *Security Studies*, Vol. 3, Winter 1993/1994, pp. 225-258. See also *Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder, eds., New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

20. Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, New York: Random House, 1998, pp. 65-68.

21. Powell's "translation" of the state notion of using the Marines as an "interpositional force" was that "the Marines were to remain between two powder kegs, the Lebanese army and Syrian-backed Shiite units fighting it out in the Shouf Mountains." Colin L. Powell with Joseph E. Persico, *My American Journey*, New York: Random House, 1995, p. 291.

22. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, n. 16, p. 232.

23. One was Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's unwise attempt to negotiate an accord with a weak president-to-be, Amin Gemayel, and without the knowledge of the United States. Another was what Shultz called a "missed moment," in which the United States failed to force Israeli and Syrian withdrawal just after the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. A third was the terrorist bombing. Shultz also claims that "our military arm was tied behind our back, by our own leaders. Beginning with the first deployment of the multinational force (MNF)—the Pentagon restricted our Marines to a passive, tentative, and dangerously inward-looking role in Beirut. Assad and others in the region could see that." Shultz concluded that the U.S. pullout signaled to the world that terrorism worked. He wanted to threaten and, if necessary, use force against terrorists where they trained. "But Cap Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs raised question after question. They would not move. And the President would not move without them." Vice President Bush agreed. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 233, 648.

24. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, especially p. 606.

25. On the Bosnian case, see James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.

26. Richard Nixon, *No More Vietnams*, New York: Avon Books, 1985, p. 224.

27. Second Annual Report of the Army After Next Project, Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA, December 7, 1998, p. 5.

28. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 648.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 199, 204, 326-329.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 650.

31. See, e.g., Anthony Lewis, "Shultz on Bosnia," *New York Times*, February 14, 1994, p. 17; Margaret Thatcher and George Shultz, "What the West Must Do in Bosnia," *Wall Street Journal*, September 2, 1993, p. 12.

32. George P. Shultz, "New Realities and New Ways of Thinking," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 63, Spring 1985, pp. 705-721; and George P. Shultz, "The Ethics of Power," *Department of State Bulletin*, February 1985, pp. 1-2.

33. George P. Shultz, "Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity," Department of State, *Current Policy*, No. 783, January 1986.

34. For the quotations, see Powell, p. 576; and Andrew J. Bacevich and Lawrence F. Kaplan, "Battle Wary: America's Flawed New Military Doctrine," *New Republic*, May 25, 1998, p. 19. Albright remained a proponent of an activist posture within the administration. See also Steven Erlanger, "Albright Sees an Ambitious World Mission for U.S." *New York Times*, June 6, 1997, p. 8.

35. See Tony Smith, "In Defense of Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 1994; Albert Wohlstetter, "Alternatives to Negotiating Genocide," *Wall Street Journal*, May 3, 1995, p. 14; Stanley R. Sloan, "From U.S. Deterrence to Self-Deterrence," *The Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 1994, p. 19; Sloan, "The United States and the Use of Force in the Post-Cold War World: Away from Self-Deterrence?" Congressional Research Service, January 6, 1997.

36. George Bush, Center for the Study of the Presidency, "Presidential Decisionmaking and U.S. Interventions," Bush Presidential Library, Texas A&M University, October 24, 1999.

37. On Desert Fox, see <http://www.time.com/time/daily/special/iraq/index.html>; on the Afghan and Sudan operations, see the comments of Peter Feaver and Christopher Gelpi at <http://www.dukene.ws.duke.edu/World/GELPE.HTM>. See also Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Domestic Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, April 1997, pp. 255-282.

38. See "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation and Associated Documents," obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act, declassified 1997, at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/ciacase/EXF.pdf>.

39. James Risen, "To Bomb Sudan Plan, or Not," *New York Times*, October 27, 1999, p. 1.

40. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982, especially chapters 7-8.

41. Secretary of Defense Cohen and CJCS General Shelton explained U.S. planning thus:

Diplomacy and deterrence having failed, we knew that the use of military force could not stop Milosevic's attack on Kosovar civilians, which had been planned in advance and already was in the process of being carried out. The specific military objectives we set were to attack his ability to wage combat operations in the future against either Kosovo or Serbia's neighbors. By weakening his ability to wage combat operations, we were creating the possibility that the military efforts of the Kosovar Albanians, which were likely to grow in intensity as a result of Milosevic's atrocities in Kosovo, might be a more credible challenge to Serb armed forces. . . .[W]e determined that Milosevic would pay a steep price for his aggression and that his decade-long pattern of warfare would be undermined.

They explain further that although some individuals expected a short war, allies were warned that it could take weeks or months. "Alliance leaders agreed in advance that if the initial strikes did not attain NATO's goals, NATO would have to persist and indeed expand its air campaign." Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton, "Joint Statement on the Kosovo After Action Review," U.S. Department of Defense News Release, October 14, 1999. In *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, Public Affairs, 2001, General (Ret.) Wesley Clark argues that the Secretary of Defense and most of his political superiors held overly optimistic views concerning the efficacy of the air campaign and risked much by not moving ahead with ground option planning, which was based on the Apaches. See Chapter 11, "The Ground Option."

42. See Steven Pelletiere, "Landpower and Dual Containment: Rethinking America's Policy in the Gulf," Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999.

43. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 332-34.

44. With regard to Serbian aggression in Bosnia, Clinton, the candidate, said, "I would begin with air power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity." Janathan Rauch, "How Kosovo Buried the Bush Doctrine," *National Journal*, October 31, 1998, pp. 2540-2541.

45. "The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces in the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World," Address by Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, September 21, 1992.

46. See Haass, *Intervention*, p. 17.

47. See Steven Erlanger, "Albright Sees an Ambitious World Mission for U.S." *New York Times*, June 6, 1997, p. 8.

48. Ivo Daalder, "Knowing When to Say No: The Development of U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping," in *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s*, William J. Durch, ed., New York: St. Martin's, 1996, pp. 35-67.

49. William J. Perry, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, February 1995, pp. 16-17.

50. A *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, December 1999, pp. 19-20. See also *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, The White House, July 1994, p. 10.

51. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, The White House, December 1999, e.g., pp. 26-27.

52. Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," speech at George Washington University, Washington, DC, March 6, 1996, in John Hillen, "American Military Intervention: A User's Guide," a Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder*, May 2, 1996, p. 7.

53. Anthony Lake, "Defining Missions, Setting Deadlines: Meeting New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War World," Remarks delivered at George Washington University, March 6, 1996, in Haass, rev. ed., pp. 247-258, especially 252.

54. William J. Perry, "The Rule of Commensurate Military Force," based on the Forestall Lecture, Foreign Affairs Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD, April 18, 1995, and reported in *Defense*, No. 3, 1995, pp. 2-7, 5-6.

55. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.

56. Robert A. Manning, "The Clinton Doctrine: More Spin than Reality," *Los Angeles Times*, September 5, 1999, at <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sept1999/e19990907clinton.htm>, retrieved on September 7, 1999.

57. This is a somewhat less critical view of the Clinton administration's approach to using force than that offered, for example, by Andrew Bacevich and Lawrence Kaplan. They argue that the administration espoused a new, fatally flawed military doctrine with four principles: technology will triumph; the threat of force will bring victory; force can be used precisely; and ground forces are a last resort. I argue that the administration lacked such a clear philosophy or set of beliefs about using force, and allowed estimates of costs—political and otherwise—to determine its strategy rather than exerting greater leadership to shape public views on the national interest and costs. See Bacevich and Kaplan, n. 34. For a powerful critique of the Clinton approach, see Andrew J. Bacevich, "Policing Utopia: The Military Imperatives of Globalization," *The National Interest*, No. 56, Summer 1999, pp. 5-13.

58. Powell, *My American Journey*, p. 559.

59. Colin L. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous," *New York Times*, October 8, 1992, p. A35.

60. Colin L. Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1992/1993, pp. 36-41, 32-45.

61. Powell, *My American Journey*, p. 434.

62. Powell noted in his memoirs that in 1984 he disagreed with Weinberger's stating criteria so clearly and unambiguously. See p. 303.

63. Powell, "U.S. Forces," p. 38.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

65. For a recent invocation of the popular version of the Powell Doctrine, see Larry Korb, "Force is the Issue," *Government Executive*, January 2000, p. 31. Prior to assuming office as Secretary of State, Powell himself continued to warn against humanitarian interventions. See "Powell: U.S. Power Alone Cannot Prevent Genocide," *Houston Chronicle*, February 15, 2000, p. 13.

66. President George Bush, "Remarks at the United States Military Academy," in Haass, rev. ed., Appendix F, pp. 223-231.

67. *Ibid.*

68. Powell, "Why Generals Get Nervous."

69. Bush, remarks at U.S. Miliary Academy.

70. Eliot Cohen, contribution to "American Power—For What?" in *Commentary*, n. 1.

71. Haass, rev. ed., see chapters 4-5.

72. Tom Bowman, "Military, Politicians Criticized for Insisting on Zero Casualties," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, April 3, 2000. See also "Army Professionalism, the Military Ethic, and Officership in the 21st Century," by Dr. Don M. Snider, Major John A. Nagl, and Major Tony Pfaff, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, December 1999.

73. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress, February 5, 1986, p. 79.

74. See Russell Weigley, "The Soldier, the Statesman, and the Military Historian," First Annual George C. Marshall Memorial Lecture in Military History, January 9, 1999, American Historical Association Annual Meeting, Washington, DC, cited in *The Journal of Military History*, No. 63, October 1999, pp. 807-822; Michael R. Gordon, "Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in Bosnia," *New York Times*, September 28, 1992, pp. A-1, A-5.

75. Samuel Huntington, "The Erosion of American National Interests," *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 1997, pp. 28-49.

76. Richard K. Betts, "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 77, No. 1, January/February 1998, pp. 26-41.

77. Ivan Eland, "Tilting at Windmills: Post-Cold War Military Threats to U.S. Security," *Policy Analysis*, No. 332, February 8, 1999. See also his "Does U.S. Intervention Overseas Breed Terrorism?" Cato Foreign Policy Briefing No. 50, December 17, 1998.

78. Ronald Steele, "Beware the Superpower Syndrome, *New York Times*, April 25, 1994, p. A11.

79. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Redefining the National Interest," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999, pp. 22-35. For an in-depth response, see Chester Crocker, "A Poor Case for Quitting: Mistaking Incompetence for Interventionism," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, pp. 183-186.

80. Edward Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999, pp. 36-44. For a helpful response, see Sergio Vieira de Mello, "Enough is Enough," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2000, pp. 187-189.

81. *American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy*, 1999, John E. Rielly, ed., Chicago CFR, p. 4, <http://www.cfr.org/publications/opinion/opinion.htm>.

82. Steven Kull, "Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping: A Study of Public Attitudes," Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, April 27, 1995, "Summary Findings."

83. Richard Sobel, "The Polls—Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 250-278.

84. Kull, "Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping." The following discussion is based upon this study and on Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, "Americans Support U.N. Peacekeeping, with Conditions," *Foreign Service Journal*, December 1998, pp. 34-40.

85. *Ibid.*

86. Steven Kull, cited in Michael P. Noonan, Rapporteur, "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention: A Conference Report," Foreign Policy Research Institute WIRE, Vol. 9, No. 5, June 2001, p. 2.

87. Kull, "Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping." The discussion is based upon this study (n.13); and on Kull and Ramsay, "Americans Support U.N. Peacekeeping, with Conditions."

88. Jonathan Mermin, "Television News and American Intervention in Somalia: The Myth of a Media-Driven Foreign Policy," *Political Science Quarterly*, Fall 1997, Vol. 112, pp. 385-403.

89. For a sophisticated argument on how the United States and China used the threat of the other for domestic purposes, see Tom Christenson, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996.

90. As a candidate, George W. Bush stated repeatedly that the United States could not practice pure *realpolitik* at the expense of its moral values: "And when American soldiers hugged the survivors of the death camps and shared their tears and welcomed them back from a nightmare world, our country was confirmed in its calling." See Michael Ignatieff, "The Next President's Duty to Intervene." *New York Times*, February 13, 2000, p. 17.

91. Michael O'Hanlon, *Saving Lives with Force*, p. 4, notes the number of conflicts and cites International Negotiation Network, *State of World Conflict Report 1994-1995*, Atlanta, GA: Carter Center, 1995, pp. 4, 60.

92. Edwin Mansfield, *Principles of Macroeconomics*, seventh ed., New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1992, p. 11.

93. In "American Power—For What?" *Commentary*, n. 1.

94. "Bush: U.S. Will be 'Sparing' on Overseas Commitments," American Forces Information Service, February 13, 2001.

95. Thomas E. Ricks, "Possible Military Overhaul Outlined: Personnel Policy May Be Targeted," *Washington Post*, May 18, 2001, p. A-1.

96. Jane Perlez, "A Steady Advocate of American Caution, Powell Faces a Changing World," *New York Times*, December 17, 2000, p. 49.

97. *Ibid.*

98. Clinton recalls that Powell recommended the mission despite a 50-50 chance of success. Powell says he was opposed to that and many related missions, such as disarming the warlords and nation-building. See *Ibid.*

99. Ralph Peters, cited in "The Question of Humanitarian Intervention: A Conference Report," n. 85, p. 6.

100. Haass and O'Hanlon provide additional principles and lessons. Haass, e.g., argues that: interests only provide general guidelines; "neither victory nor an exit date should be prerequisites" for using force; "popular and congressional support are (sic) desirable but not necessary" for intervention; the early use of force is preferable to the later use; and overwhelming force is better than gradualism. *Intervention*, rev. ed., chapters 4-5. O'Hanlon draws convincing conclusions regarding force structures for different kinds of missions, and argues that the United States should not intervene unless certain thresholds of violence are crossed; interventions should not risk wider conflicts; policymakers should be skeptical about their ability to influence the domestic politics of some states; interventions "should not seek to defeat very strong armies supported by mass movements"; and indigenous security forces are necessary for successful interventions in populous nations, among other points. (See *Saving Lives with Force*, n. 2, especially chapters 2-3.)

101. Powell, "U.S. Forces," p. 40.

102. John Lewis Gaddis, "Drawing Lines: The Defensive Perimeter Strategy in East Asia, 1947-1951," *The Long Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987, chapter 4.

103. Dean Acheson, *Present At the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, New York: Norton, 1969, p. 405.

104. According to one senior policymaker, “we had photos coming from two directions. The difference was that in Somalia we could do something about it.” Sidney Blumenthal, “Why are we in Somalia?” *The New Yorker*, October 25, 1993, p. 48.

105. See “Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change,” Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, February 15, 2001, “Major Themes and Implications,” and p. 49.

106. The early theoretical arguments for this are found in Johan Galtung, “On the effects of Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” *World Politics*, No. 19, April 1967, pp. 378-416; and Lewis Coser, *The Functions of Social Conflict*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1956.

107. Mueller, n. 18. On World War II, see Richard Polenberg, *One Nation Divisible: Class, Race, and Ethnicity in the United States since 1938*, New York: Viking Press, 1980.

108. Steven Kull, “Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping: A Study of Public Attitudes,” Program on International Policy Attitudes, University of Maryland, April 27, 1995; Rand Research Brief, “Public Support for U.S. Military Operations,” Santa Monica, CA: March 1996.

109. Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*,” Rand, 1996.

110. Steven Kull, “What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn’t,” *Foreign Policy*, No. 101, Winter 1995-96, pp. 102-115; Kull and Ramsay, “Americans Support U.N. Peacekeeping, with Conditions,” Kull, “Americans on U.N. Peacekeeping: A Study of Public Attitudes,” “Summary Findings.” See also Richard Sobel, “The Polls—Trends: United States Intervention in Bosnia,” *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 250-278.

111. James H. Anderson, “The Low Casualty Dogma,” *Semper Fi*, Marine Corps Commemorative Booklet 2000, p. 178.

112. Tom Bowman, “Cost of War: A New Accounting,” *Baltimore Sun*, March 22, 2000.

113. Peter Fever and Christopher Gelpi, “How Many Deaths are Acceptable? A Surprising Answer,” *Washington Post*, November 7, 1999, p. 83.

114. Richard L. Berke and Janet Elder, “Poll Finds Support for War and Fear on Economy,” *New York Times*, September 25, 2001, p. A1, B6.

115. See, for example, Brian McGrory, Michael Kranish, "America Prepares/Rebuilding; Allies, Critics Say Clinton Fell Short in Terror Fight," *Boston Globe* September 21, 2001, p. A1.

116. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 650.

117. For arguments that earlier use of force would have saved lives and resources in Bosnia, see Gow, *Lack of Will*, n. 25; Haass, *Intervention*, pp. 113-114.

118. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 650.

119. Weinberger speech, see n. 2.

120. John Garofano and Chris Seiple, "The Gulf War as a Point of Departure," unpublished manuscript, March 2001. I am indebted to Chris Seiple for the phrase.

121. Paul Kennedy, *Grand Strategies in War and Peace*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991, p. 5.

122. See Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute/Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996.

123. See John Garofano, "Deciding on Military Intervention: What is the Role of Senior Military Leaders?" *Naval War College Review*, No. 53, Spring 2000, pp. 40-64.

124. For the argument that Operation JUST CAUSE provides a blueprint for intervention due to bold planning and the goal of decisive strategic outcomes, see Tom Donnelly, "Lessons Unlearned: A Comparison of Three American Wars," *The National Interest*, No. 60, Summer 2000, pp. 76-82. For the argument that victory was due to other factors, see the exchange with the author in the Fall 2000 issue of *The National Interest*. On the widespread misinterpretations of the victories in Panama and the Gulf and for an argument that decisive force and total victory should not be prerequisites for the use of force, see F. G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1996.

125. For more on this phenomenon and a number of historical case studies, see Irving Janis, *Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Policy Decisions and Fiascoes*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982, 2nd ed.; and Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1981.

126. See n. 94.

127. Basil Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, New York: New American Library, 1974, p. 322.

128. John Mueller argues that the American public showed a great immunity to withdrawing support due to the killing of Iraqis. See Mueller, *Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 134-135.

129. William Gregor, "Toward a Revolution in Civil-Military Affairs: Understanding the United States Military in the Post Cold War World," Working Paper No. 6, August 1996, *U.S.-Post Cold War Civil-Military Relations*, Olin Institute, Harvard University, at: <http://www-vdc.fas.harvard.edu/cfia//olin/pubs/no6.htm>.

130. See Robert H. Dorff, "The Future of Peace Support Operations," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 9, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 160-178. Reprinted in Max Manwaring and John Fishel, eds. *Toward Responsibility in the New World Disorder: Challenges and Lessons of Peace Operations*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1998, pp. 160-178.

131. For a concise summary of a vast amount of the Vietnam literature, see Jeffrey Record, *The Wrong War: Why We Lost in Vietnam*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1998.

132. Garofano, n. 134.

133. It should be noted that I attribute shortcomings in strategic decisionmaking with regard to the use of force to the unavailability of information and relevant concepts, rather than to the inability of leaders to process or understand them. For arguments emphasizing nonrational sources of decisions, see Irving Janis, *Groupthink* and Lebow, *Between Peace and War*, both n. 104; Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976. Alexander George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice*, Westview, 1980, deals with both rational and nonrational sources of low-quality decision processes.

134. For an argument about the early sources of this blurring, see Douglas T. Stuart, "National Interest and National Security," *Perspectives of the Carnegie Council on Ethics*, Fall 1999.

135. Barbara Levitt and James G. March, "Organizational Learning," *Annual Review of Sociology*, No. 14, 1988, pp. 319-340, especially 322.

136. Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War*, New York: The Free Press, 1990, p. 195.

137. Amy B. Zegart, *Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC*, Stanford University Press, 1999, contains an excellent discussion of the policy and implementation problems caused by maladapted institutions. See also Douglas T. Stuart, "Present at the Legislation: The 1947 National Security Act" in *Organizing for National Security*, Stuart, ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2000, pp. 5-24.

138. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, pp. 26-27.

139. General Anthony C. Zinni, U.S. Marine Corps, "A Commander's Reflections," *Proceedings*, March 2000, at <http://www.usni.org/Proceedings/Articles00/prozinni.htm>. See also his report before the Army Science Board, March 28, 2000, which claimed the United States will continue to be involved in operations other than war, which he labeled "reluctant bleeding."

140. Garofano, n. 113, and remarks at the Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College, April 8, 1999. See also John Garofano, "Ensuring Better Decisions on Using Force," *Passing the Torch: Recommendations to the Next President on Emerging National Security Issues*, Council on Emerging National Security Affairs, November 2000, pp. 88-92.

141. The U.S. Commission on National Security in the 21st Century recommends inclusion of Treasury on the NSC, as well as a major expansion in the budget and the planning and strategy roles of State.

142. See Douglas T. Stuart, "National Interest and National Security," n. 144.

143. Thom Shanker, "Defense Chief will Propose Military Change in Course," *New York Times*, June 15, 2001, at <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/15/national/15MILI.html?searchpv=day03>.

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145. General Eric Shinseki, Statement before Airland Subcommittee, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, 2nd session, 106th Cong., "On the Army Transformation," March 8, 2000.

146. Steven Metz, "Future of Land Warfare," unpublished manuscript, June 2001.

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